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"DEIFIC DECREE":
THE SHORT, HAPPY LIFE OF
A PSEUDO-DOCTRINE
And [God] said, Take now thy son, thine only son Isaac,
whom thou lovest, and get thee into the land Moriah; and
offer him there for a burnt offering upon one of the moun-
tains which I will tell thee of. 1
The wrongs of aggrieved suitors are only the algebraic
symbols from which the court is to work out the formula of
justice.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Why is "deific decree" 3 so odd? This exception to the
M'Naghten test for criminal insanity4 is a strange amalgam of law
and theology. Under the deific decree exception, a defendant who
can prove an insane delusion that God spoke to him and commanded
his criminal act, is not guilty by reason of insanity. 5 Such a narrow
1. Genesis 22:2 (King James).
2. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 76 (1903).
3. Deific decree is the name given by the court in State v. Crenshaw, 659
P.2d 488, 494 (Wash. 1983), to a doctrine first articulated in People v. Schmidt,
110 N.E. 945 (N.Y. 1915). As this Comment will argue, the deific decree
doctrine has much older roots, and those roots are the primary source of the
current confusion. See infra notes 144-186 and accompanying text.
4. The M'Naghten test is the one most often used to determine whether a
defendant is legally insane. The relevant language states that, to be found in-
sane, the defendant must prove:
that, at the time of the committing of the act, the [defendant] was la-
bouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not
to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did
know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.
M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843).
5. See Crenshaw, 659 P.2d at 494. This is deific decree in its "pure" state.
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exception is rarely invoked,6 and when it is pleaded, it almost never
meets with success.
7
Nevertheless, deific decree has inspired extensive discussion by
several state appellate and supreme courts during the last two dec-
ades,8 as well as its own section in legal casebooks.9 Why so much
debate over this peculiar species of auditory hallucination?' 0 Two
reasons:
First, deific decree is seen, correctly or incorrectly, as one of the
only volitional exceptions 1 to the cognitive M'Naghten test.12 For a
For one variation, see People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 139 (Colo. 1992)
(holding that "the 'deific-decree' delusion is not so much an exception to the
right-wrong test ... as it is an integral factor in assessing a person's cognitive
ability to distinguish right from wrong with respect to the act charged as a
crime").
6. Based on a review of appellate-level opinions, in cases in which it was
formally invoked. A defendant's insanity is often established pre-trial; in such
a case, there may be no record of what the defendant's symptoms were. This is
consistent with the general rule of insanity defenses: rarely invoked, seldom
successful. Cf Andrew Blum, Debunking Myths of the Insanity Plea, NAT'L
L.J., Apr. 20, 1992, at 9 (demonstrating that, despite the insanity plea's reputa-
tion as a criminal's ticket to freedom, juries rarely acquit on the basis of insan-
ity).
7. See, e.g., Schmidt, 110 N.E. at 950; Crenshaw, 659 P.2d at 494. There
are a number of other cases, but it is significant that the two cases which define
the doctrine reject its application in the same breath.
8. See, e.g., Ivery v. State, 686 So. 2d 495 (Ala. 1996); People v. Serravo,
823 P.2d 128 (Colo. 1992); State v. Wilson, 700 A.2d 633 (Conn. 1997); State
v. Worlock, 569 A.2d 1314 (N.J. 1990); State v. Rice, 757 P.2d 889 (Wash.
1988); State v. Cameron, 674 P.2d 650 (Wash. 1983); State v. Crenshaw, 659
P.2d 488 (Wash. 1983).
9. Law students will be familiar with deific decree from its discussion in
SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 937-43 (6th ed. 1995).
10. While it is not impossible to imagine "God" issuing a command by
means of pictures, text, or other visual hallucinations, the deific decree almost
always comes as the "voice of God." This fits within clinical definitions of in-
sanity. Auditory hallucinations are among the eleven "first-rank symptoms" of
schizophrenia proposed by Kurt Schneider in his textbook. See KURT
SCHNEIDER, CLINICAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 17 (M.W. Hamilton trans., 1959).
11. See Crenshaw, 659 P.2d at 494 ("[I]t would be unrealistic to hold [de-
fendant] responsible for the crime, since [defendant's] free will has been sub-
sumed by [defendant's] belief in the deific decree." (emphasis added)). "Free
will" is, as its phrasing suggests, an emphatically volitional concept, and only
in a purely "volitional" test could "free will" be a great enough factor to over-
ride a person's knowledge of right and wrong.
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judge who finds cognitive tests unjust, this exception is almost irre-
sistible because it allows the jurist to discuss volitional defenses
without straying outside a cognitive framework.
There is, however, a second, equally compelling reason, which
starts with an assumption diametrically opposed to the first reason:
that deific decree is a cognitive exception to a cognitive doctrine.
Seen this way, deific decree's purpose is to shed light on one of the
most stubborn ambiguities of the M'Naghten doctrine: What does
the phrase "knowledge of wrongfulness" mean?13  Does it mean
"wrong" under the law? Under the law of God? Under the law of
personal morality? The morality of society? Since deific decree, as
originally defined by the Washington Supreme Court, is an exception
to a societal standard of right and wrong, it presupposes such a
standard and therefore has a place in its discussion.
15
This may explain why deific decree still survives, but it does not
answer the original question, which is why deific decree seems so
odd-odd in the way an optical illusion seems odd. Its oddity is the
subject of this Comment, and it provides a cautionary tale of what
happens when a judge makes doctrine without the benefit of facts, or
conversely, with the truly unique "benefit" of having made up the
facts himself.
Thus, deific decree is interesting only in part because of what it
says about legal insanity. It is also interesting because of what it
says about the nature and pitfalls of dicta, about the power of judicial
rhetoric, and about the drawbacks of pragmatic or politically influ-
enced jurisprudence. Therefore, Part II of this Comment explains the
12. See M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843).
13. See id. The debate over knowledge of wrongfulness is ongoing. See
Bageshree V. Ranade, Note, Conceptual Ambiguities in the Insanity Defense:
State v. Wilson and the New "Wrongfulness" Standard, 30 CONN. L. REV.
1377 (1998).
14. See Crenshaw, 659 P.2d at 494; see also People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d
128, 139 (Colo. 1992) (rejecting deific decree as an exception but retaining it
as a factor in assessing a defendant's ability to distinguish right from wrong).
15. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 723 P.2d 464, 466-67 (Wash. 1986) (in
which defendant argued that the Washington NGI (not guilty by reason of in-
sanity) statute, WASH. REv. CODE § 9A.12.010 (1988), was unconstitutionally
overbroad and a violation of the Establishment Clause of the Washington Con-
stitution, WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11, because of the holding in State v. Cam-
eron, 674 P.2d 650 (Wash. 1983), and that therefore he could resort to hy-
potheticals to prove the constitutional violation).
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two ways in which deific decree is strange or inconsistent and why
these inconsistencies are significant. Part IIl briefly outlines the im-
portance of fact in common law and why the law imposes factual
constraints on judges. Part IV discusses the various insanity doc-
trines, with an emphasis on M'Naghten. Part V traces the peculiar
history of deific decree: its origins in the confluence of the ecclesi-
astical and secular courts of England; Judge Benjamin Cardozo's use
of it as an emotionally charged hypothetical in People v. Schmidt,
and its metamorphosis into a genuine pseudo-doctrine in the Wash-
ington Supreme Court. Part VI examines deific decree today and
asks whether it has any practical use.
II. Two TYPES OF ODDITY AND WHAT THEY MEAN
At first glance, deific decree appears to rest on a common sense
statement: namely, that persons who hear the voice of God are
mentally ill. As an observation, this makes sense. Legal exceptions,
however, are not bald statements. By implication, an exception both
interprets the rule it purports to limit, and, at the same time, excludes
other possible exceptions. When we examine these two implications,
deific decree begins to look incoherent. This incoherence manifests
itself in two ways: first, in deific decree's irrational narrowness, and
second, in its excessively literal-minded construction of the
M'Naghten test. These oddities are in turn the product of a judicial
history which, upon close inspection, is fairly curious itself.
A. Narrowness: An Exception Limited to God
Deific decree makes sense on the most basic of levels. A person
who genuinely feels compelled by God to murder is probably insane
by any definition-psychiatric, legal, or common sense. When the
layperson thinks of an insane defendant, the deific decree defendant
could be a template: a person with advanced paranoid-type schizo-
phrenia, suffering from auditory hallucinations which cause the per-
son to act in a severely antisocial manner. 16 If it is believable that
16. See, e.g., AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 287 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter
DSM IV]. "The essential feature of the Paranoid Type of Schizophrenia is the
presence of prominent delusions or auditory hallucinations in the context of a
relative preservation of cognitive functioning and affect .... [D]elusions are
1758
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the person is genuinely schizophrenic, genuinely hears voices which
tell him to do things, and genuinely believes that he must obey those
voices, it is also believable that such a person would murder because
the voice of God told him to.
On the same basic level, however, this exception makes less
sense than meets the eye. If all of the above criteria are in place-
paranoid schizophrenia, auditory hallucinations, compulsive behav-
ior-do we really care which voice is commanding the defendant?
For instance, in State v. Cameron,17 the defendant was found not
guilty by reason of insanity, based on his delusion that God had spo-
ken to him. He also believed at various times that he was being per-
secuted by the Ayatollah Khomeini and Yasser Arafat.18 When it
comes to auditory hallucinations, is the voice of God really more
compelling than the voice of a middle-eastern religious leader?19
Once we concede that the defendant has been compelled to act,
the source of the compulsion becomes irrelevant. 20 If we believe that
typically persecutory or grandiose, or both, but delusions with other themes
(e.g., jealousy, religiosity, or somatization) may also occur." Id. This particu-
lar combination of symptoms wreaks havoc with cognitive definitions of in-
sanity, since the "schizophrenic, paranoid-type" will likely understand the na-
ture and quality of his acts and even understand that he is doing what is wrong,
while still feeling justified because of his firm belief in the reality of his delu-
sions.
17. 674 P.2d 650 (Wash. 1983).
18. See id. at 653.
19. For instance, David Berkowitz, the infamous "Son of Sam" killer,
claimed to receive messages from the barking of his neighbor's dog. See
DAVID ABRAHAMSEN, CONFESSIONS OF THE SON OF SAM 116 (1985); Angie
Cannon, Crime Stories of the Century, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 6,
1999, at 50. While a dog's voice-to our minds-lacks the grandeur of deific
decree, it is no less (or more) convincing as a command hallucination.
20. Professor Irving Gottesman, a leading scholar on the subject of schizo-
phrenia, claims that experts generally accept that the content of hallucinations
is not particularly helpful in diagnosing mental illness. Hallucinatory "con-
tent" is usually either culturally encoded or intensely personal to the schizo-
phrenic person. See Telephone Interview with Irving Gottesman, Professor of
Psychology, University of Virginia (Jan. 23, 1999). Naturally, when when we
speak of a delusional "voice," we are not speaking of the true voice of the per-
sonage: that is, there is no question that Gary Cameron was not commanded
by the real God, any more than David Berkowitz was commanded by a dog
from the Bronx, bent on creating mayhem by proxy. The "voices" these men
heard were in fact inaccessible parts of their own psyches, to which they as-
signed voices of authority, probably well after the fact. Therefore, assigning
1759June 2000]
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defendants can be compelled by auditory hallunications, the interests
of justice require that we consider "command hallucinations" in gen-
eral, not just "deific command hallucinations."
B. Extrapolating from the Artifice of "Right and Wrong"
The M'Naghten test is a "cognitive" 21 test. It deals with what
the defendant "knows." To be judged insane under M'Naghten, the
defendant must either not know what he is doing, or if he knows what
he is doing, he must not know that it is wrong.2 2 Despite its ac-
knowledged inadequacies,2 3 a significant plurality of United States
jurisdictions have enacted some form of the M'Naghten test.24
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that M'Naghten ac-
curately describes the insane defendant's state of mind. When Dan-
iel M'Naghten concluded that the Tories were planning to murder
him, it strains common sense to think that he made a further con-
ceptual leap to the idea that he was morally justified in killing the
prime minister.2 5  Clearly, the most important phrase in the
an identity to the delusion is a way of rationalizing the compulsion which, by
its very nature, cannot have an identity. Deific decree, however, takes this
post-hoc identity very seriously, ignoring the fact that the measure of authority
given the voice is just another aspect of the defendant's psyche. See id.
21. "Cognitive. The mental process of comprehension, judgment, memory
and reasoning, as opposed to emotional and volitional processes." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 259 (6th ed. 1990).
22. See M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843).
23. See, e.g., People v. Schmidt, 110 N.E. 945 (N.Y. 1915). "The
[M'Naghten] definition of insanity established by the [New York] statute...
has been often and harshly criticized. [S]ome states reject it altogether." Id. at
949 (citations omitted).
24. The following jurisdictions have M'Naghten-type insanity statutes: 18
U.S.C. § 17 (1994); ALA. CODE § 13A-3-1 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.010
(Michie 1962); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-502 (West 1956); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 25 (West 1999); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8-101, 16-8-101.5 (1986 &
Supp. 1999); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-2, 16-3-3, 16-3-28 (1988); IND. CODE §
35-41-3-6 (1998); IOWA CODE § 701.4 (1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:14
(West 1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 39 (West 1983); MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 28.788(1) (Law. Co-op. 1990); MINN. STAT. § 611.026 (1987); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 9-3-97 (1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-1 (West 1995); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 40.15 (McKinney 1998); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2901.01(A)(14) (West 1996); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1161 (1998); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 315 (1998); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-10 (Law. Co-op. 1985);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-501 (1997); WASH REV. CODE § 9A.12.010 (1988).
25. See RICHARD MORAN, KNOWING RIGHT FROM WRONG: THE INSANITY
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M'Naghten test is the least controversial: that the defendant must be
suffering "from disease of the mind,'' 26 or, in psychiatric terms, a
"psychotic... disturbance.,
27
The right/wrong distinction, however, is not just makeweight.
Ability to distinguish right from wrong is probably the oldest test for
insanity.28 Right and wrong, however, is a distinction which has lit-
tle resonance in psychiatric definitions of mental illness. The defini-
tion of "delusion" in the standard guide to mental disorders, The Di-
agnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM IV),
neither mentions nor implicates moral discernment. 29 A psychiatrist
might examine Robert Pasqual Serravo's belief that God had told
him to build a multi-million dollar sports complex 30 as a misinter-
pretation of perceptions or experience-that is, as an explanation of
the reality in which Serravo was living. The law, on the other hand,
presumes that Serravo lives in the same reality as us-it only wants
to know if Serravo knew it was wrong to stab his wife.3' This is not
surprising: the law is not trying to understand Serravo; it is trying to
judge him. On the other hand, M'Naghten purports to test whether
Serravo knows right from wrong but refuses to consider Serravo's
reality-a reality which could go a long way in explaining Serravo's
understanding. How can such a test be justified?
C. Deific Decree in Light ofM'Naghten's Social Policy
The best response to the above question is the most straightfor-
ward: the law presumes that everyone sees the same reality.
3 2
DEFENSE OF DANIEL MCNAUGHTAN 90 (1981).
26. M'Naghten, 8 Eng. Rep. at 722.
27. DSM IV, supra note 16, at 278.
28. See generally Anthony Platt & Bernard L. Diamond, The Origins of the
"Right and Wrong" Test of Criminal Responsibility and Its Subsequest Devel-
opment in the United States: An Historical Survey, 54 CAL. L. REv. 1227
(1966) (tracing the origin and development of right/wrong tests for insanity in
the United States and Great Britain).
29. "Delusions... are erroneous beliefs that usually involve a misinterpre-
tation of perceptions or experiences." DSM IV, supra note 16, at 275.
30. See People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 131 (Colo. 1992).
31. See id.
32. See generally Allison Dundes Renteln, A Justification of the Cultural
Defense as Partial Excuse, 2 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 437 (1993)
(noting how the above statement glides over the common sense reality that
"reality" and "common sense" are both in part culturally determined). See also
June 2000] 1761
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Overcoming that presumption is difficult-and, considering
M'Naghten's origins,33 we may fairly assume that it is intended to be
difficult. Only total cognitive impairment or total moral impairment
with regard to the criminal act will overcome the presumption. This
sub-part looks at three ways of justifying this legal presumption.
First, one can argue that M'Naghten observes a rigid line between le-
gal and psychiatric categories.34 Since, in current psychiatric terms,
its presumption is questionable, M'Naghten must preserve its coher-
ence by ruthlessly refusing to allow psychiatric reasoning into its
elements. Second, one can argue that M'Naghten is simply a prag-
matic test.3 5 By posing a simple, objective question to the jury, it
allows the jury to follow its own natural reasoning processes. The
jury may consider the defendant's subjective reality, but the law will
not sanction the reality, nor will it provide guidelines. Third, one can
say that M'Naghten's presumption, because it is so difficult to over-
come, is an expression of society's disapproval of or anger at crime
in general-even when crime is committed by the genuinely insane
person. More particularly, it evinces disapproval of and rage at sham
insanity defenses.
Accepting these policy justifications as valid, it is clear the dei-
fic decree does not consistently advance any of them. First, deific
decree violates the bright line between psychiatry and law by inviting
jurors to analyze the defendant's subjective reality within a single
narrow area. In doing this, it robs M'Naghten of the coherence
which comes from strictly limiting its field of inquiry. Second,
id. at 445. Accepting this idea, however, would violate M'Naghten's pre-
sumption of objectivity.
33. See infra notes 229-32 and accompanying text.
34. "[M'Naghten] ... does not state a test of psychosis or mental illness.
Rather, it lists conditions under which those who are mentally diseased will be
relieved from criminal responsibility." Joseph M. Livermore & Paul E. Meehl,
The Virtues ofM'Naghten, 51 MINN. L. REv. 789, 800 (1967).
35. Pragmatism, as a philosophy, can be briefly summed up in a phrase:
"To develop a thought's meaning, we need therefore only determine what con-
duit it is fitted to produce; that conduct is for us its sole significance."
WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 399 (Bruce Kuk-
lick ed., Library of America 1st ed. 1990) (1902). Cardozo puts it this way:
"[T]he juristic philosophy of the law is at bottom the philosophy of pragma-
tism. Its truth is relative, not absolute.... The final principle of selection for
judges, as for legislators, is one of fitness to an end." BENJAMIN CARDOZO,
THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 102-03 (1921).
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deific decree blunts the pragmatic force of M'Naghten by pretending
to offer the jury guidance where M'Naghten itself offers none. Fi-
nally, while deific decree may once have had special significance in
a heavily Christian society, in a pluralistic society it resembles a
highly controversial "cultural defense." 36 While cultural defenses
may be a good idea, they are inimical to M'Naghten, which assumes
that all people see the same reality. Therefore, in its present form,
deific decree actually undermines the policies ofM'Naghten.
The first justification-the bright line between law and psychia-
try-is mentioned by Cardozo in People v. Schmidt.37 While ac-
knowledging the "views of alienists,' ' 38 which disfavor M'Naghten,
Cardozo points out that such views can have little or no weight in
evaluating New York's statutory M'Naghten rule; instead, one must
evaluate the rule on its own terms.39 This is the classic argument for
M'Naghten: that it tests, not mental disease, but criminal responsi-
bility.4 0 Since the only probative factor in criminal responsibility is
moral reasoning, "the law has no choice but to define responsibility
in terms of it.'41 We can redefine the rationale as this: a simplified
version of the human mind is our most useful model, legally speak-
ing. It is particularly useful when we apply a simplified definition of
insanity, such as ability to distinguish right from wrong. If we at-
tempt to complicate the model of the human mind, we will be unable
to apply a rule such as M'Naghten, because we are adding variables
for which the simplified rule has no category.
But this is precisely what deific decree does. By giving special
status to religious delusions, deific decree says one of two things:
first, that the religiously delusive person does not inhabit the same
reality as all other persons; or alternatively, that the religiously delu-
sive person has an extra part to his simplified mind, which all other
persons do not have. If we take either one of these assumptions
36. A "cultural defense" is one in which the actions of a defendant "[are]
judged against behavioral standards that are reasonable for a person of that
culture in the context of this culture." Renteln, supra note 32, at 440.
37. 110 N.E. 945 (N.Y. 1915).
38. Id. at 949.
39. See id.
40. See Livermore & Meehl, supra note 34, at 816.
41. Id.
1763June 2000]
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as true, then M'Naghten's model of the mind loses coherence and, by
extension, validity.
On the other hand, perhaps M'Naghten's major virtue is not co-
herence, but only simplicity. If the rule is simple but not entirely co-
herent, it should be judged, not by its content, but by its results. Car-
dozo is also comfortable with this test. All laws, he points out, must
one day "justify their existence as means adapted to an end."
42
Evaluated in this light, M'Naghten, if not a conceptual success,
is at least a partial pragmatic success. In one of the few empirical
studies of different insanity instructions, Professor Rita J. Simon as-
sembled one hundred experimental jury panels.43 Each panel heard
testimony on one of two fact patterns. One was a close, complex
case, the other was clear-cut, in that the defendant had done some-
thing morally wrong.44 Each panel heard one of three sets of jury in-
structions: a M'Naghten instruction, a Durham45 instruction, and a
simple instruction to find the defendant guilty or not guilty by reason
of insanity.46 In the clear-cut case, there was no statistical difference
between the jury panels' decisions.47  In the close case, the
M'Naghten panels returned no acquittals. The Durham panels and
the panels with no instructions acquitted about twenty percent of the
time.48
This tells us the following: M'Naghten is a stricter test than the
other two tests in a close case-but the difference is not dramatic.
And in a clear-cut case, there is practically no difference. This could
suggest that juries make up their minds based on criteria outside their
instructions. It could also mean that M'Naghten, while it limits the
number of successful insanity pleas, does not do so on any rational
basis. Under this model, M'Naghten guides the jury to a general area
of inquiry-moral reasoning-and sets the conceptual bar high
enough to know that the defense should be used sparingly. The
42. Cardozo, supra note 35, at 98.
43. See RITA JAMES SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY 58
(1967).
44. See id. at 45-46, 70-74.
45. See infra notes 99-110 and accompanying text.
46. SIMON, supra note 43, at 36-37.




jury applies common sense within this generously bounded area,
using a few simple tools, and generally produces the right result.
A positive rationale for the above model would go as follows:
Insanity is irreducibly complex and fact-bound. So is "common
sense." Respecting both of these mysterious processes, we depend
the jury's innate sense of justice to produce a good result, with
minimal guidance. A more cynical explanation would be to say that
M'Naghten essentially offers no guidance, and results in a kind of
jury nullification which is, paradoxically, fair and efficient. It should
be noted again that this model does not require us to parse
M'Naghten by its language. The mechanism of decision is in the
minds of the jury members, not in the rule.
Under this justification, deific decree is notably unhelpful. If
the price for granting free rein to the jury's common sense is strict
simplicity of rule, deific decree needlessly complicates this by treat-
ing the rule literally. This goes against the above pragmatic policies
in one of two ways. First, it confuses the jury by telling the jury that
it must parse right and wrong, not as common-sense categories but as
Judeo-Christian categories. This artificially skews what we hope are
common-sense results. Alternatively, it tells the jury that common
sense reigns in all areas of legal insanity except those where the de-
fendant has been religiously inspired. Again, this produces lopsided
results overall, and devalues the presumption at the heart of this justi-
fication-that untrammeled common sense produces fair results.
This, by extension, devalues M'Naghten.
Finally, using a kind of expressivist4 9 analysis, M'Naghten's
moral categories may be a proxy for societal analysis of the crime
underlying the insanity defense, or prophylactic disapproval of bad-
faith insanity defenses. An expressivist justification for M'Naghten
would remind the jury that the defendant has in fact committed a
criminal act. The justice system has to account for the act by moral
condemnation, except in the rare case where the insanity defense has
enough countervailing moral force to relieve the defendant of
49. "Under the expressive view, the signification of punishment is moral
condemnation. By imposing the proper form and degree of affliction on the
wrongdoer, society says, in effect, that the offender's assessment of whose in-
terests count is wrong." Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions
Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 591, 598 (1996).
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responsibility. The "meaning" of M'Naghten is that restoring social
equilibrium by condemnation is a higher social good than examining
the mechanism of insanity. A strict, morality-based insanity test is
the best expression of this social meaning.
A darker version of this expressive rationale is Michael Perlin's
"societal rage" theory.50 According to Perlin, the insane criminal
awakens our own feelings of moralized aggression.51 By punishing
criminals, we punish our own desires to transgress social boundaries
by holding up the criminal as an example of what would happen if
we went too far.52 We then purge ourselves of these personified an-
tisocial feelings by constructing a symbolic social pageant-the court
of judgment-and then imprisoning those who personify transgres-
sion.53 When a person is found not guilty by reason of insanity, an
entire structure is suddenly challenged: the structure whose sole
purpose is to convince us that it is good to obey social strictures.
54
This would explain the "river of fury" that afflicts the public when a
prominent defendant is declared not guilty by reason of insanity.
55
Seen this way, M'Naghten is not a test, looking at the insane person
to decide his guilt, but rather a safety valve, looking at the public to
see how many successful insanity defenses it can bear. 56
Whether we look at M'Naghten as a conduit for societal disap-
proval or a safety valve for social rage, deific decree again con-
found's M'Naghten's intent. Deific decree redefines the "meaning"
of M'Naghten to suggest that crimes inspired by religious delusions
50. See Michael L. Perlin, "The Borderline Which Separated You from
Me": The Insanity Defense, the Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of Faking, and
the Culture ofPunishment, 82 IowA L. REv. 1375 (1997).
51. See id. at 1388.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 1387.
54. See id. at 1388-89.
55. Id. at 1395 (discussing public outrage after John Hinckley's acquittal by
reason of insanity for the attempted murder of Ronald Reagan).
56. The history of the M'Naghten doctrine supports this. M'Naghten was
decided in an atmosphere of public outrage and intense political pressure. See
Richard Moran, The Modern Foundation for the Insanity Defense: The Cases
of James Hadfield (1800) and Daniel McNaughtan (1843), in 477 THE
ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE:
THE INSANITY DEFENSE 31, 39-40 (Richard D. Lambert & Alan W. Heston
eds., 1983) [hereinafter Hadfield & McNaughtan].
1766
"DEIFIC DECREE"1
are less deserving of condemnation than those inspired by "ordinary"
delusions.
Thus, deific decree may once have had the salutary effect of re-
balancing social disapproval or anger in nineteenth and early twenti-
eth century America. This comports with Joseph Westermeyer's
conclusions about delusions in the context of different cultures.
57
Westermeyer concludes that delusional content is "not only culture
bound, but also perhaps bound to particular historical periods."
58
Seen this way, deific decree cannot possibly fulfill its original
expressive purpose. Cultural indicators have changed far too much.
Westermeyer cites a 1961 study by F.S. Klaf and J.G. Hamilton
which compares patients' delusional content in the nineteenth cen-
tury at Bedlam Royal Hospital, London, with present-day delusional
content.59 They found that nineteenth century delusional themes
were primarily religious, while mid-twentieth century delusional
themes were primarily sexual.6 °
Irving Gottesman also has observed the radically changed con-
tent of delusions since the turn of the century.6 1 Although an "obses-
sion with great sources of power" is common to paranoid schizo-
phrenics, the source of that "power" has changed. Until a few
decades ago, God or Jesus was the likely source. Now, with new
technologies cropping up, and global communications commonplace,
the president, the CIA, or radio or television may now be the focus of
such delusions.
62
57. See Joseph Westermeyer, Some Cross-Cultural Aspects of Delusions, in
DELUSIONAL BELIEFS 212 (Thomas F. Oltmanns & Brendan A. Maher eds.,
1988).
58. Id. at 214.
59. See F.S. Klaf & J.G. Hamilton, Schizophrenia-A Hundred Years Ago
and Today, 107 J. MENTAL SCI. 819 (1961).
60. See id. Westermeyer also quotes a Ziirich study which finds a similar
drop-off in religious/magical delusions from 1912 to 1973. See S. Steinbrun-
ner & C. Scharfetter, Changes in Delusional Psychosis-A Historical
Transcultural Comparison, 222 ARCHIV FOR PSYCHIATRIE UND
NERVENKRANKHEITEN 47 (1976).
61. See Joe Sharkey, Paranoia is Universal. Its Symptoms are Not, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 2, 1998, § 4, at 4 (quoting Irving Gottesman, Professor of Psy-
chology at the University of Virginia).
62. See id.
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Similarly, with the influx of new immigrant groups, the source
of a defendant's "insanity" may be bound up with cultural values
from the mother country.63 Renteln cites People v. Kimura, where a
Japanese American mother attempted oyako-shinju, or parent-child
suicide, in order to eradicate a perceived family shame.6' Her law-
yers, with some success, pleaded temporary insanity.65 What success
they did achieve was widely assumed to be the result of cultural fac-
tors.
66
The logical modernization of deific decree would then be to ex-
tend it to include cultural defenses of all types. This would really be
the only acceptable solution, since any other would implicitly de-
value all other religions which do not believe in a monotheistic God
who "speaks" to humans. This, however, goes against the central
precept of M'Naghten-that every person presumptively sees the
same reality. If all reality is heavily shaded by cultural factors,
common sense is similarly culture-bound, and the simple, unitary as-
sumptions of M'Naghten become hopelessly fragmented. Thus, the
expressivist justifications for deific decree turn around and diminish,
not only M'Naghten, but deific decree itself.
If we look at deific decree in light of any of these justifications,
we see that, far from advancing the M'Naghten rule, they undermine
it. The only other possibility is to tum around and try to justify
M'Naghten in light of deific decree. This, however, demands that we
treat the categories of M'Naghten as real, descriptive mental health
categories. This is not just mistaken-it is dangerous. Allowing the
formal conceit of M'Naghten to serve as a description of mental
health categories can calcify into an unquestioning belief that
M'Naghten does describe reality-and then we will really not know
where fiction ends and reality begins.
Ill. INTERLUDE: FOUR TESTS FOR INSANITY
Three points must be made about modem American tests for le-
gal insanity.67 First, not a great deal has changed since M'Naghten.
63. See Renteln, supra note 32.
64. See id. at 463.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. This section does not pretend to be a complete, or even an incomplete,
1768
Although both the Durham68 and Model Penal Code (MIPC)69 tests
add or change elements of M'Naghten, both are tied to M'Naghten
because they must react to it. In other words, any test which changes
or rejects M'Naghten must prove that it is better and more efficient,
or the jurisdiction will default to M'Naghten. Second, not a great
deal has changed about the context of insanity jusrisprudence. In-
sanity remains one of the most politicized subjects in criminal law.
A familiar trend is this: judges liberalize insanity doctrine over a pe-
riod of years, only to see their work pruned back following a well-
publicized insanity acquittal.70 Third, in such a murky area as insan-
ity law, it is not unusual for judges to "create" insanity doctrine by a
talismanic reliance on the words of a particular doctrine or example.
As we shall see below, all of these trends contribute to the creation of
deific decree.
A. The M'Naghten Test
The M'Naghten test has been described as having "the rigidity
of an army cot and the flexibility of a Procrustean bed," as well as
"bad psychiatry and bad law.' Yet M'Naghten is the bedrock of
American insanity jurisprudence. 72 Perhaps this is because it came
from such an authoritative source: the Queen's Bench, sitting en
bane, saying emphatically what the law of insanity was.
73
The facts surrounding M'Naghten, however, tell a different
story, one which illustrates two of the above themes. First, the
M'Naghten questions were posed in an atmosphere of political out-
rage over Daniel M'Naghten's acquittal.74 The judges were called
history of the insanity defense. However, the general trends described in this
section specifically bear upon the creation of the deific decree doctrine.
68. See infra notes 99-110 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 111-19 and accompanying text.
70. See infra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
71. Perlin, supra note 50, at 1382 (quoting Jodi English, The Light Between
Twilight and Dusk: Federal Criminal Law and the Volitional Insanity Defense,
40 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 47 (1988); Robert Sadoff, Insanity: Evolution of a Medi-
colegal Concept 20 (Sept. 1986) (paper presented at College Night, the College
of the Physicians of Philadelphia)).
72. See supra note 24.
73. See THOMAS MAEDER, CRIME AND MADNESS: THE ORIGINS AND
EVOLUTION OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 35 (1985).
74. See id. at 30.
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before Parliament in lieu of stricter legislation regarding the insanity
defense.75 In a very real sense, the judges were sitting as legislators.
Thus, M'Naghten illustrates the second theme discussed above-ju-
dicial decision-making under political pressure.
Second, although the questions were phrased in the abstract,
they were carefully tailored to reflect the facts of M'Naghten,
76 par-
ticularly those concerning "partial delusions" and delusions "in re-
spect of one or more particular subjects."77  Despite this, the
M'Naghten questions, particularly Question Number Three, 7' have
been applied to facts never contemplated in the original case.
This volatile situation-judges sitting as legislators in a time of
public outrage-is practically a recipe for trouble, as Justice Maule
recognized in his opinion, written separately from the other judges.
"I feel great difficulty in answering the questions put by your Lord-
ships on this occasion," he wrote, "because they do not appear to
arise out of and are not put with reference to a particular case, or for
a particular purpose, which might explain or limit the generality of
their terms."
79
His fears were well-founded. M'Naghten is one of the most de-
contextualized opinions in the history of law. First, it was written
after Daniel M'Naghten was already acquitted. 80 Second, the ques-
tions were phrased abstractly, allowing the judges to pretend that
they were not re-ruling on M'Naghten's case. And third, the all-
important Question Number Three, 81 which now is the M'Naghten
test, was answered in conjunction with Question Two, which limited
itself to "insane delusion[s] respecting one or more particular sub-




76. See M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 720 (1843).
77. Id. at 722.
78. "3d. In what terms ought the question to be left to the jury, as to the
prisoner's state of mind at the time when the act was committed?" Id. at 720.
The answer to this question is the basis for the M'Naghten test. See id. at 722.
79. Id. at 720.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 720. The capitalizations are in M'Naghten.
82. Id.
83. See WAYNE L. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 311
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It has been argued convincingly that both the "twenty pence"
test 84 and the wild beast test85 were originally meant simply as illus-
trations of mental states, yet ended up as the definitions of those
same mental states. 86 Thus, M'Naghten illustrates the third theme
discussed above-the expansion of elements of insanity doctrine far
beyond their contexts. This is not unusual.
Since its inception, the decontextualized M'Naghten test has
been condensed into two elements: "(1) . . . that the accused have
suffered a defect of reason, from a disease of the mind; and (2)...
that consequently at the time of the act he did not know (a) the nature
and quality of the act, or (b) that the act was wrong."87 This in turn
has been further abstracted as the "Right-Wrong" test.
88
B. The Irresistible Impulse Test
The unfortunately-named irresistible impulse test is the one true
volitional test in insanity jurisprudence. 89 Not surprisingly, it has not
been widely accepted. 90 Simply put, it requires "a verdict of not
guilty by reason of insanity if it is found that the defendant had a
mental disease which kept him from controlling his conduct."
91
There is no mention of knowledge, nor of right and wrong.
Irresistible impulse is most thoroughly explained in Parsons v.
State92 and was partly endorsed in Commonwealth v. Cooper.
93
(2d ed. 1986).
84. Describing an idiot as "such a person who cannot account or number
twenty pence, nor can tell who was his father or mother, nor how old he is,
etc." MAEDER, supra note 73, at 6 (citing Rex v. Hawkins, 1 PLEAS OF THE
CROWN 2 (1716)).
85. See infra note 235.
86. See MAEDER, supra note 73, at 6.
87. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 83, at 311.
88. Id. at 310.
89. See id. at 320. "Unfortunately named" because the test has often been
criticized on the basis of the name alone. See id. at 322 (reviewing criticism of
irresistible impulse). The language of irresistible impulse, however, is not as
general as the label. See infra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
90. See LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 83, at 320 & n.95.
91. Id. at 320.
92. 2 So. 854 (Ala. 1887).
93. 106 N.E. 545 (Mass. 1914). "[I]f the jury find that ... the defendant
was overborne by some irresistible and uncontrollable impulse springing from
mental defectiveness or disease to do the act which he knows to be wrong, he
is not legally responsible." Id. at 547.
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Cardozo refers to both opinions in People v. Schmidt, and flatly re-
jects them, saying, "That is not the test with us." 94 This is hardly
surprising, in light of the fact that the idea of insanity as a loss of
control was espoused by Dr. Isaac Ray.95  M'Naghten's strict
right/wrong dichotomy was in part a reaction to Ray's progressive
theories, which figured heavily at Daniel M'Naghten's trial. 96
Irresistible impulse has been criticized both for being too nar-
row 97 and for being too permissive.98 Most of these arguments are
moot, since irresistible impulse is all but extinct.
C. The Durham Test
One test, however, which did enjoy a brief currency as the alter-
native to M'Naghten, is the Durham99 or product test, which simply
states that "an accused [is] not criminally responsible if his unlawful
act [is] the product of mental disease or defect." 100 The product test
was foreshadowed by the 1871 case of State v. Jones,'0 ' in which
New Hampshire became the first American jurisdiction to repudiate
M'Naghten.02 The product test arises from the acceptance of the re-
ality that any attempt to impose a structure on the components of in-
sanity is either doomed to fail or must be restricted to the facts of a
single case. 10 3 Therefore, the question posed to the jury or judge
should be as unrestricted as possible, allowing the case to be tried
completely on its facts.1
0 4
The New Hampshire product test was not adopted by any other
jurisdiction until Judge Bazelon, of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit, decided, in Durham v.
94. People v. Schmidt, 110 N.E. 945, 949 (N.Y. 1915).
95. See LAFAvE & SCoTT, supra note 83, at 320 & n.96 (citing ISAAC RAY,
THE MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY 263 (1838)).
96. See Ranade, supra note 13, at 1379.
97. See LAFAvE & SCoTr, supra note 83, at 321-22 (citing claims that "ir-
resistible" is too restrictive a modifier).
98. See id. at 322 (citing claims that a defense of "impulse" circumvents the
deterrence function of criminal law).
99. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
100. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 83, at 323.
101. 50 N.H. 369 (1871).
102. See id. at 387-88.
103. See id. at 392-93.
104. See id. at 393.
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United States,'°5 that the "existing tests of criminal responsibility are
obsolete and should be superseded."'
10 6
Bazelon formulated a new test, modeled on the New Hampshire
test:10 7 "an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act
was the product of mental disease or defect."'1 8 This test, Bazelon
hoped, would put the burden of defining insanity on the psychiatric
experts during trial so that doctrine could evolve along with advances
in scientific knowledge. 10 9 Like the New Hampshire test, Durham
was not widely adopted and was superseded in the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit by the Model Penal Code test in 1972.110
D. The Model Penal Code Test
The Model Penal Code (MPC), or "substantial capacity" test for
insanity attempted to strike a balance between the M'Naghten and ir-
resistible impulse tests."' It reads:
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at
the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease
or defect he lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the
criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to con-
form his conduct to the requirements of law.
(2) As used in this Article, the terms "mental disease or
defect" do not include an abnormality manifested only
by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social con-
duct.112
At first glance, this looks like the ideal insanity test, with some-
thing to please everyone. It substitutes "substantially appreciate" for
"know," thereby softening the harshness of M'Naghten, yet it can
still be termed a right/wrong test because of its alternative use of the
word "wrongfulness." ' 1 3 It contains a quasi-volitional component in
105. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
106. Id. at 864.
107. See id. at 874.
108. Id. at 874-75.
109. See id. at 242.
110. See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (adopting
the Model Penal Code test for insanity).
111. See LAFAvE & SCOTT, supra note 83, at 329.
112. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1985).
113. See LAFAvE & SCOTT, supra note 83, at 330.
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its "unable to conform" language, yet it tempers that component with
paragraph two, which pointedly excludes the "psychopathic person-
ality.' '114 Though the Durham115 test may appeal more to psychia-
trists, the MPC test is more realistic, given that the jury, not the psy-
chiatrist, is the ultimate user of the test. A layperson will always
respond to the moral element in an insanity test. 116 Taking out the
moral element and having a psychiatrist decide the definition of in-
sanity may produce the incongruous result of having the jury decide
insanity based on no rule at all.
Other United States courts of appeals soon adopted the test.
117
In 1984, however, everything changed when John Hinckley at-
tempted to assassinate President Ronald Reagan and was found not
guilty by reason of insanity in federal court. 118  In a scenario
strangely reminiscent of M'Naghten, public outrage over the verdict
prompted Congress to enact a federal insanity statute closely pat-
terned on M'Naghten.119 Thus, the MPC test's fate illustrates the
second theme of this section-politicization of the insanity defense.
The foregoing history demonstrates above all the robustness of
M'Naghten. Other tests, though demonstrably more rational, have
met with criticism or outright hostility. M'Naghten, on the other
hand, provokes a sort of weary resignation: for all its deficiencies, it
offers the comforting artifice of simplicity and morality.
Deific decree is an exception carved out of such an artifice.
Since there can be no coherent exception to a fiction, deific decree
really should not exist at all. That it does exist is a testament to a pe-
culiar process ofjurisprudence called pseudo-doctrine.
IV. PSEUDO-DOCTRINE DEFINED
The confusion inherent in deific decree is the product of a
strange judicial mutation which we can only term a
114. Id.
115. See Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
116. See SIMON, supra note 43, at 72.
117. See LAFAVE & SCOTt, supra note 83, at 330 n.65 (citing ten circuits
which adopted a form of the Model Penal Code test).
118. See Perlin, supra note 50, at 1395.
119. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II, §
402(a), 98 Stat. 2057 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 20 (1999)); renumbered Pub. L.
No. 99-646, § 34(a), 100 Stat. 3599 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 17 (1999)).
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pseudo-doctrine. 120 Consider how deific decree began. In People v.
Schmidt,12 1 the defendant admitted that his deific decree defense was
completely fabricated; yet the deciding judge went on with the analy-
sis of this same defense, judged as if it were true. He illustrated the
defense, not with the facts of the case, but with a hypothetical anec-
dote.
1 22
Both before and after Schmidt, the classic situation in which dei-
fic decree arises closely resembles the facts of Schmidt: the defen-
dant pleads deific decree, the judge disbelieves him, whereupon the
judge goes on to analyze the defense as if it were true, hypothesizing
a fact pattern where it might be successful. It is not uncommon to
see a defense which is difficult to prove; but, in order to have a life
beyond theory, there must be real-life fact patterns which actually fit
this defense.
Even in the absence of applicable facts, a doctrine might survive
because it explains something which has no better explanation. In
other words, it is inert but coherent, waiting for the day when it will
be useful.
Deific decree, by contrast, is internally incoherent. Either it is a
disease of the defendant's moral choosing mechanism, in which case
it is irrelevant that the defendant is clinically delusive; or it is an irre-
sistible command delusion, in which case it is irrelevant that the
commanding voice has any genuine moral authority.
120. Since there is no formal definition of "pseudo-doctrine," this Comment
will use the one proposed by Professor Samuel Pillsbury of Loyola Law
School: Pseudo-doctrine occurs when one or more judges create rules based,
wholly or partially, on non-facts. Pseudo-doctrine is not to be understood as
the opposite of doctrine, since there is also no clear agreement on what doc-
trine means. For instance, Roscoe Pound defines doctrine as "[s]ystematic fit-
tings together of rules, principles, and conceptions with respect to particular
situations or types of case or fields of the legal order." Roscoe Pound, Hierar-
chy of Sources and Forms in Different Systems of Law, 7 TUL. L. REV. 475,
485 (1933). This sounds like the definition in Black's Law Dictionapy---"A
rule, principle, theory, or tenet of the law," BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 481
(6th ed. 1990)--until Pound goes on to say that "[doctrines], [a]s a rule...
have no formal authority," and places them below "Conceptions" in his hierar-
chy of authority. Pound, supra, at 482-86.
121. 110N.E. 945 (N.Y. 1915) (Cardozo, J.).
122. See id. at 949.
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Further, while deific decree began as a cognitive exception to
the cognitive M'Naghten doctrine, 123 it has since transformed into a
volitional exception to a cognitive test, 124 and then finally into a
"factor" to be considered 125 among others. Though all of these ver-
sions have their isolated advantages over the other versions, none is
wholly consistent.
A. Definition: Deific Decree
In contemporary terms, deific decree describes a subcategory of
auditory hallucination, a classic symptom of paranoid schizophre-
nia.126 A mentally ill person suffers from a "command hallucina-
tion." She 127 hears a voice which directs her to do certain things, and
she feels compelled to do them. In some cases, she will be utterly
unable to resist carrying out the commands, which may come in any
number of "voices": for instance, the man who sold her a house,
128
the CIA, 129 or various political figures and celebrities. 130 The deific
decree doctrine, however, refers only to auditory hallucinations
which speak in the voice of God.
B. Definition: Doctrine
Black's Law Dictionary defines doctrine as, "[a] rule, principle,
theory, or tenet of the law." 131 It is widely accepted, however, that
there is more to it than that. Rules arise from distinguishing fact
situations from other fact situations; what makes a legal rule a rule is
that it applies to at least two different fact situations. 32 On the other
123. See id. at 947-48.
124. See State v. Crenshaw, 659 P.2d 488, 494 (Wash. 1983).
125. See People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 139 (Colo. 1992).
126. DSM IV calls it "Schizophrenia, Paranoid-type." See supra note 16 and
accompanying text.
127. In keeping with Cardozo's language in Schmidt, 110 N.E. at 949, the
protagonist of the deific decree doctrine is a woman.
128. See IRVING I. GOTrESMAN, SCHIZOPHRENIA GENESIS: THE ORIGINS OF
MADNESS 25 (1991) (describing a 33-year-old white male diagnosed schizo-
phrenic; the voice told him to change his sewer system, which he did).
129. See id. at 47.
130. See id. at 48.
131. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 481 (6th ed. 1990).
132. Karl N. Llewellyn calls this the "One Single Right Answer" stabilizing
factor in jurisprudence. Although there is really no "one single right answer,"
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hand, legislatures make rules all the time with no specific facts be-
fore them. Why bother with facts at all?
C. Why Facts Are Important
If Frederick Banting discovers insulin by mistake, we do no
condemn him-we give him the Nobel Prize. 133 We do not speculate
about the innocent diabetic dogs who might have died because
Banting made certain calculations in the laboratory. 134 We accept
that the scientific method involves trial and error.
A judge, however, gets only one chance to get it right. If the
judge wishes to experiment, the judge's subjects are not diabetic
dogs, but human beings. Judicial experiments can and do lead to
guilty persons' freedom and innocent persons' deaths. Applying the
Banting model: even if the "insulin" defense turns out to be a bril-
liant legal doctrine and lasts, unchanged, for five hundred years, it
would simply not be worth the thousands of litigants who would fall
victim to various failed "diabetic dog" defenses.
To ensure that something like the "diabetic dog" defense never
happens, the judicial system has a basic limiting factor: facts. A
judge may not simply adopt a theory because it is intellectually at-
tractive, or even because it is brilliant. The judge may not use the
theory until she reviews a set of facts whichfit the theory. Applying
the theory to the facts of the case, a rule is born. The rule may be
applied to other, subsequent facts, but only if the facts bear a family
resemblance to the facts of the rule-making. This ensures that the
rules of law are tied to reality. It also reassures citizens-all of
whom are potential defendants-that they will not be faced with a
different set of rules every time they go to court.
the attempt to find one is a good thing, because without it, we would have as
many right answers as cases. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW
TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 24-25 (1960).
133. See LEO KATZ, ILL-GOTrEN GAINS: EVASION, BLACKMAIL, FRAUD
AND KINDRED PUZZLES OF THE LAW xii (1996). The discussion of Banting's
possibly mistaken discovery of insulin takes place in the context of Katz's dis-
cussion of "The Misappropriation of Glory."
134. Banting used diabetic dogs in his laboratory experiments. At a crucial
point in his research, he concluded that some dogs had improved their condi-
tion when in fact they had not. This led, indirectly, to the discovery of insulin
as a treatment for diabetes. See id. at 217.
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Of course, if the facts of the next case are dramatically different,
an entirely different rule may apply. But this simply places the facts
of the next case in a different lineage. The principles still apply; the
next case simply looks back to a different predecessor case.
Roscoe Pound defines it this way: Rules are "precepts attaching
a definite, detailed legal consequence to a definite, detailed state of
facts."'135 When one wants to change a Rule, one must resort to Prin-
ciples136 applied to the Rule and a new set of facts.
Even if one does not subscribe to Pound's terminology, it is a
canon of law that all judicial decisions must begin with a set of facts.
This idea is repeated in a variety of contexts: for instance, the well-
known prohibition against advisory opinions in federal courts.
137
The Court in Flast v. Cohen invokes another reason to prohibit judi-
cial rule-making without a concrete set of facts: it violates the sepa-
ration of powers. 138 When a judge makes law without a fact pattern,
the judge is engaging in a legislative function without legislative ac-
countability.
139
Finally, in addition to reducing uncertainty and honoring the
separation of powers, society ties common law to facts in order not
to grant too much power to any single judge. This is what Karl
Llewellyn calls the "Frozen Record From Below."'140 As he puts it,
"[t]he fact material which the appellate judicial tribunal has official
liberty to consider in making its decision is largely walled in."'
141
The trial court has decided it beforehand. 142 Therefore, not only do
we not allow judges to decide law without facts, we do not even al-
low the same judge to decide fact and make law. The appellate judge
has the "frozen" record from below. The trial level judge has the
"frozen" law from above.
135. Pound, supra note 120, at 482. The capitalizations are Pound's.
136. Principles are "authoritative starting points for legal reasoning, em-
ployed continually and legitimately where cases are not covered or are not
fully or obviously covered by rules in the narrower sense." Id. at 483.
137. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96-97 (1968) (explaining the
"case or controversy" requirement in federal courts).
138. See id. at 96.
139. See id.





All of these judicial strictures fade away when a judge hypothe-
sizes in the context of rule-making. All at once, the judge is not only
potentially violating the separation of powers by making law without
facts; but also, by making up the facts themselves, the appellate
judge is violating her specific judicial office. The violation is only
"potential" because the hypothesis does not violate any judicial rules
unless there is a second essential agent: another judge who takes this
judicial plaything, treats it as law, and applies it to a new set of facts.
At that point, the making of a pseudo-doctrine is complete.
V. THE STRANGE HISTORY OF DEIFIC DECREE
A. The Roots of Incoherence
Deific decree seems out of place in twentieth century jurispru-
dence. On the other hand, it was right at home in the jurisprudence
and theology of medieval Europe. This part of the Comment briefly
traces the history of distinguishing religious hallucinations from
"natural" hallucinations, a distinction which had its roots in a time
when law and religion were closely allied, and, more specifically,
when the question of "demonic possession" was one which might
still be raised in a court of law.
The idea of deific decree survived this period of legal history as
a useful hypothetical, divorced from its religious/legal roots and
floating to and fro in the essentially naturalistic doctrines which were
current in the centuries before and after M'Naghten. That it now
survives, plausibly, as a volitional exception to a cognitive doctrine
does not in any way detract from its theistic origins.
To arrive at a tentative explanation of how deific decree sur-
vived until its revitalization in People v. Schmidt,143 we must trace
the relation of "God" and "madness" in pre-M'Naghten Europe.
144
One possible explanation is that it is a version of the "posses-
sion/witchcraft" distinction used by ecclesiastical courts before and
during witch-hunts of the late Middle Ages. A second and related
143. 110N.E. 945 (1915).
144. The author of this Comment does not claim either the scholarship or the
expertise to conduct a full-scale examination of the history of insanity. A few
representative cases will have to serve as an outline for some future, more ex-
haustive work.
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explanation is that it survives as a doctrine of mercy, related to the
time when the person who "was under the visitation of God"'45 was
presumed insane and could not be held accountable for criminal ac-
tions.
There were two primary ways of looking at insanity in medieval
England. The first was not even a theory. Insanity was not an af-
firmative defense to a charge of murder; instead, the defendant had to
be convicted on the evidence.1 46 Only then could the defendant's
relatives go before the king and plead for the defendant's life. The
king could then grant a pardon on the basis of insanity.
Even here, religion played a part. The king was God's repre-
sentative on earth, having been put on the throne by Him. Therefore,
the king's pardon was itself a kind of deific decree. It was also
squarely within church doctrine. The insane person might have
sinned in the worst possible way, but sinners deserved mercy, and
none more than those who were touched by the hand of God, and
therefore non compos mentis.
The second view of insanity was based on equating the insane
with children. 147 While adults were freely able to choose good over
evil, children and the insane were constrained in their choices: "All
men have freedom but it is restrained in children, in fools, and in the
witless who do not have reason whereby they can choose the good
from the evil.' 48 Note that this language can be construed as either
cognitive 49 or volitional. 15  Under either definition, however, the
insane were shown mercy.
Some sinners, however, never received mercy from the church:
namely, witches and other consorts of Satan. In medieval Europe,
the crime of maleficia, or black magic, could be prosecuted in either
secular or ecclesiastical courts. 151  However, as the crime of
145. Rex v. Arnold, 16 Howell's State Trials 695, 765 (1724).
146. See MAEDER, supra note 73, at 5; see also Schmidt, 110 N.E. at 946.
147. See Platt & Diamond, supra note 28, at 1232-33.
148. Id. at 1233 (quoting MICHEL, AYENBIT OF INWIT, OR REMORSE OF
CONSCIENCE 86 (Morris ed. 1866)(1340)).
149. "[W]ho do not have reason .... ." Id. (quoting MICHEL, AYENBIT OF
INWIT, OR REMORSE OF CONSCIENCE 86 (Morris ed. 1866) (1340)).
150. "[F]reedom ... is restrained .... " Id. (quoting MICHEL, AYENBIT OF
INWIT, OR REMORSE OF CONSCIENCE 86 (Morris ed. 1866) (1340)).
151. See DANIEL N. ROBINSON, WILD BEASTS AND IDLE HUMOURS: THE
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witchcraft became progressively associated with heresy, it was pur-
sued more and more in the secular courts with the active assistance
of the clergy.152 A secular court needed doctrinal guidance. In the
fifteenth century, that guidance was largely provided by the Malleus
Maleficarum, a handbook on trying witches, written by two Domini-
cans, Kramer and Sprenger.153 The authors made no principled dis-
tinction between insane and cunning behavior, believing both to be
the devil's work.154 In practice, however, the church recognized a
difference between possession and witchcraft: "To be possessed by
demons was to be a victim. To be a witch was to be a willing par-
ticipant.' 5 5 This is in keeping with the church's essentially voli-
tional view of criminal liability. 156 When the functions of the eccle-
siastic and secular courts merged in the Middle Ages, the volitional
theories of the church became part of the common law.
157
Paradoxically, despite its legal hard-line on what we would now
call insanity, the church had a record of treating the mentally ill with
humanity.'58 Bethlem Hospital, in London, was remarkably kind and
enlightened, and their former inmates were treated with so much
compassion that vagrants would wear forgeries of armbands which
identified the wearer as a released inmate of Bethlem. 159 Contrast
the period from the Renaissance to the nineteenth century, a time in
which "medical jurisprudence" was on the rise: patients were
whipped, chained, left unwashed, and ill-fed, and Bethlem Hospital
became so chaotic and cruel that its then-nickname, "Bedlam" be-
came a synonym for total confusion.
160
The confluence of these two trends-the possession/witchcraft
distinction and the tendency of the church to view the mentally ill as
unable to help themselves, is evident in Judge Tracey's instructions
INSANITY DEFENSE FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE PRESENT 84 (1996).
152. See id. at 85.
153. See HENRY KRAMER & JACOB SPRENGER, MALLEUS MALEFICARUM
(Rev. Montague Summers trans., 1928) (1486).
154. See id. at 218.
155. ROBINSON, supra note 151, at 81.
156. See id. at 66.
157. See id. at 109.
158. See GOTTESMAN, supra note 128, at 10.
159. See id.
160. Id. at 10-11.
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in Rex v. Arnold.16 1 Arnold, with no apparent motive other than his
own delusion that his intended victim was "an enemy of God and
country," had attempted to murder Lord Onslow. 16  A parade of
witnesses, including Arnold's brothers and sisters, took the stand in
his defense. 163 His sister testified that she had "never heard him
speak six sensible words together"'164 and described his persecution
complex regarding Lord Onslow.1
65
The judge's instructions to the jury included the then-prevailing
wild beast test. 166 It also included the following language: "If
[Arnold] was under the visitation of God, and could not distinguish
between good and evil . . . he could not be guilty of any offence
against any law whatsoever."'1 67 What is remarkable, for our pur-
poses, is that Arnold was not pleading deific decree. "Under the
visitation of God" was used as a general term for delusional behav-
ior.
The case of Rex v. Hadfield168 provided the next opportunity to
review the legal status of delusions. James Hadfield attempted to
shoot George Ii at a theatre in Drury Lane, missing entirely.169 Two
days earlier, he had attacked his eight-month-old son, believing that
"heaven" wanted both him and the baby dead. As a result, he be-
lieved, all of mankind would be redeemed. 170  There was over-
whelming evidence that his condition was the result of a brain injury:
Hadfield had been nearly decapitated at the Battle of Flanders, and
his brain was permanently exposed.
17 1
Thomas Erskine, regarded as the greatest trial lawyer in Eng-
land, defended Hadfield. 172  Advising him was Dr.
161. See Arnold, 16 Howell's State Trials at 765.
162. See ROBINSON, supra note 151, at 130.
163. See id. at 131-33.
164. Arnold, 16 Howell's State Trials at 725.
165. See id.
166. See infra note 235 and accompanying text.
167. Arnold, 16 Howell's State Trials at 765.
168. 27 Howell's State Trials 1281 (1800).
169. See ROBINSON, supra note 151, at 142.
170. See id. at 148.
171. See Hadfield, 27 Howell's State Trials at 1320; see also ROBINSON, su-
pra note 151, at 147.
172. See ROBINSON, supra note 151, at 142.
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Alexander Crichton, author of An Inquiry into the Nature and Ori-
gins of Mental Derangement.1
73
After an exhaustive review of the various tests for insanity, and
in particular the wild beast test, 174 Erskine put forth a new test for in-
sanity. It was tailored to persons like Hadfield, who alternated be-
tween normal and abnormal spells. To satisfy the wild beast test, Er-
skine suggested, "the defendant must be effectively an idiot.',
17 5
Instead, "[dlelusion, . . . where there is no frenzy or raving madness,
is the true character of insanity; and where it cannot be predicated of
a man standing for life or death for a crime, he ought not, in my
opinion, be acquitted."' 7 6 Erskine was not just making delusion suf-
ficient for a finding of insanity; he was making it necessary.
177
Therefore, the mindset behind deific decree has two possible re-
ligious/legal origins. First, it may have survived as a literalization of
the phrase from Rex v. Arnold178 that a person "under the visitation
of God ... could not distinguish between good and evil. ' 179 Or it
may just have survived as a general sense of compassion toward the
religiously-inspired insane person.
It is interesting that, if Hadfield had committed his crime in
Washington State in the 1980s, he would have been acquitted on the
defense of deific decree. 180 His delusions were overwhelmingly re-
ligious; he was acquitted and committed to a mental hospital for
life.' 8' Contrast this with Bellingham's Case,8 2 where the defen-
dant's delusion was that the Crown owed him money and would not
173. See id. at 142-44 (citing ALEXANDER CRICHTON, AN INQUIRY INTO THE
NATURE AND ORIGINS OF MENTAL DERANGEMENT, COMPREHENDING A
CONCISE SYSTEM OF PHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY OF THE HUMAN MIND,
AND HISTORY OF THE PASSIONS AND THEIR EFFECTS (1798)).
174. See infra note 235 and accompanying text.
175. Hadfield, 27 Howell's State Trials at 1314; see also ROBINSON, supra
note 151, at 145.
176. Hadfield, 27 Howell's State Trials at 1314; see also ROBINSON, supra
note 151, at 146.
177. See ROBINSON, supra note 151, at 146.
178. 16 Howell's State Trials 695 (1724).
179. Id. at 765.
180. See infra notes 271-326 and accompanying text.
181. See ROBINSON, supra note 151, at 149.
182. 1 COLLINSON ON LUNACY 636 (1812).
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pay up.183 Once again, we come full circle to the distinction between
"deific" and "other" delusions. Bellingham and M'Naghten both had
"secular" delusions. Bellingham was convicted. 184 M'Naghten was
acquitted and set off a storm of controversy.185 In 1915, when
Schmidt186 was decided, these concerns were still very much alive.
B. People v. Schmidt
Whatever Benjamin Cardozo's aims were in writing the Schmidt
opinion, it is safe to say that creating pseudo-doctrine was not one of
them. On the other hand, it is also safe to say that, if another judge
had written the Schmidt opinion, deific decree would not exist. It is
the traits that we may think of as quintessentially "Cardozian"-the
oracular style, the rhetorical flourishes, the seemingly preordained
conclusions-which gave the opinion its persuasive force. Where
another judge would have written forgettable dicta, in Cardozo's
hands these same dicta became memorable. This memorability,
however, had unforeseen and unfortunate consequences.
1. Cardozo and the oracular style
"There is an accuracy that defeats itself by the over-emphasis of
details."' 87  This was Cardozo's own pronouncement on judicial
opinion-writing, and he took his own advice very seriously. Car-
dozo's writing is regarded as some of the most elliptical in American
law.
188
Cardozo's famously indirect style had a purpose, however.
Judge Richard Posner describes Cardozo as a "shy pragmatist"
189
who used a "'professionally' smooth, legal insider's style"' 90 to
183. See id.
184. See id. at 674.
185. See ROBINSON, supra note 151, at 170-71.
186. People v. Schmidt, 110 N.E. 945 (N.Y. 1915).
187. BENJAMIN CARDOZO, Law and Literature, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF
BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO 341 (1947).
188. This is one of the kinder adjectives used to describe Cardozo's style:
"frustrating" and "elusive" are two of the less generous modifiers. See
RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 9-19 (1990) (re-
viewing scholarly criticism of Cardozo's style).
189. Richard A. Posner, Judges' Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?), 62




disguise a pragmatic ideology. 191 Cardozo's style gave him a unique
advantage, since it allowed him to promulgate innovative or even
controversial theories of law, while appearing to take incremental,
formalist steps.192 This "insider's style," delivered with utter confi-
dence, made Cardozo's opinions unassailable, at least until the reader
unpacked the rhetoric.
Similarly, Cardozo's talent for aphorism prompted the citing
judge to adopt a metonymic approach to Cardozo's opinions, using a
single phrase--"danger invites rescue, ' ' 193 for instance-to stand for
a whole opinion.
Finally, Cardozo extended his skillful use of rhetoric, not just
into his statements of law, but also into his statements of facts. This
use of the statement of facts as a persuasive device is not unique to
Cardozo, but he was a particularly accomplished practitioner. 
194
Nowhere is this more apparent than in Cardozo's brief and ab-
stract statement of facts in Palsgrafv. Long Island Railroad Co.:
195
Plaintiff was standing on a platform of defendant's railroad
after buying a ticket to go to Rockaway Beach. A train
stopped at the station, bound for another place. Two men
ran forward to catch it. One of the men reached the plat-
form of the car without mishap, though the train was al-
ready moving. The other man, carrying a package, jumped
aboard the car, but seemed unsteady as if about to fall. A
guard on the car, who had held the door open, reached for-
ward to help him in, and another guard on the platform
pushed him from behind. In this act, the package was dis-
lodged, and fell upon the rails. It was a package of small
191. See id.; see also supra note 35.
192. See generally Joshua P. Davis, Note, Cardozo's Judicial Craft and
What Cases Come to Mean, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 777 (1993) (arguing that Car-
dozo was able to change the doctrine of promissory estoppel by means of his
indirect style).
193. Wagner v. International Ry. Co., 133 N.E. 437, 437 (N.Y. 1921).
194. See, e.g., Karl L. Llewellyn, A Lecture on Appellate Advocacy, 29 U.
CHI. L. REv. 627, 637-38 (1962) (discussing Cardozo's use of the statement of
facts in Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917), to subtly
prejudice the reader against Lady Duff-Gordon, and leading the reader to "the
conclusion that the case has to come out one way").
195. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
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size, about fifteen inches long, and was covered by news-
paper. In fact it contained fireworks, but there was nothing
in its appearance to give notice of its contents. The fire-
works when they fell exploded. The shock of the explosion
threw down some scales at the other end of the platform
many feet away. The scales struck the plaintiff, causing
injuries for which she sues.
196
Here, Cardozo is in no danger of overemphasizing details. We
could read Palsgraf a hundred times and never know the following
facts: that the explosion was so severe that it ripped a huge hole in
the platform and could be heard several blocks away;197 that the
scales were as tall as Helen Palsgraf and that the glass in the scales
shattered and fell on her; 198 that the crowd on the platform panicked
and that the ensuing stampede, not the explosion, may have knocked
over the scales; 9 9 and that the "injury" for which Mrs. Palsgraf sued
was a severe stutter which developed several days after the acci-
dent.2° ° Cardozo also refused to discuss the probable distance be-
tween Mrs. Palsgraf and the explosion-more than ten feet but
probably less than thirty feet.20 1 Leave out the actual location of the
train platform-East New York2° 2-and the reader may feel trans-
ported into a strange, featureless world, full of uncertain terror. The
statement of facts creates an anxiety in the reader which demands the
reassurance of authority-a reassurance which Cardozo was happy to
provide in the remainder of the opinion.
"To philosophize is to generalize, but to generalize is to
omit."20 3 It is not a stretch to say that Palsgraf created a philosophy
196. Id. at 99.
197. See POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION, supra note 188, at
34 (citing Bomb Blast Injures 13 in Station Crowd, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25,
1924, at 1).
198. See id.
199. See William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 3 n.9
(1953) (quoting SCoTr & SIMPSON, CASES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE 903 (1950)).
200. See POSNER, CARDOzO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION, supra note 188, at
35.
201. See Prosser, supra note 199, at 3 n.10.
202. See id. at 2 n.5.
203. CARDOZO, supra note 187, at 341. Cardozo claims here to be quoting
Oliver Wendell Holmes from memory. He provides no citation.
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204of proximate cause. Cardozo's phrases, "the eye of ordinary vigi-
lance, ' 2°5 and "negligence in the air,''206 are talismans of tort law.
Posner describes this style as "gnomic." 20 7  Certainly, Cardozo
speaks in Palsgraf with an Olympian authority which suggests that
his opinion is the last word on the subject: "Life will have to be
made over, and human nature transformed, before prevision so ex-
travagant can be accepted as the norm of conduct, ', 20 8 he extrava-
gantly intones, rejecting a more expansive definition of duty and
foreseeability.
Posner suggests that this is the reason Cardozo left his statement
of facts so abstract and general. 20 9 An opinion with a more specific
set of facts could have been limited to fact patterns "in which the
type of injury that occurs is unforeseeable." 210 Instead, Cardozo
wanted to write a short primer on negligence. Specific facts would
have gotten in the way.211 The abstraction of facts, the aphoristic
phrasing, the tremendous rhetorical confidence with which Cardozo
makes his argument-all this has the effect of blurring law, fact,
policy, and philosophy until the entire opinion seems like a statement
of truth.
2. The oracular style in People v. Schmidt
A similar dynamic was at work in People v. Schmidt.2 12
Schmidt was one of Cardozo's first cases after he took his seat on the
New York State Court of Appeals.213 From Cardozo's subsequent
204. Prosser calls it "the most celebrated of all tort cases." Prosser, supra
note 199, at 1.
205. Palsgraf 162 N.E. at 99.
206. Id.
207. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION, supra note 188, at 44.
208. Palsgraf 162 N.E. at 100.
209. See POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION, supra note 188, at
42-43.
210. Id. at43.
211. There is outside evidence for this view. Prosser tells how Cardozo
heard the facts of Palsgraf as a hypothetical in a debate over the Restatement
of the Law of Torts long before he heard the same facts as a judge. See
Prosser, supra note 199, at 4.
212. 110 N.E. 945 (N.Y. 1915).
213. See RICHARD POLENBERG, THE WORLD OF BENJAMIN CARDOZO:
PERSONAL VALUES AND THE JUDICIAL PRocEss 52 (1997).
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statements about the Schmidt opinion, it is apparent that he had an
agenda beyond a simple decision of the case. l4 As in Palsgraf, Car-
dozo wanted to make law for all time; specifically, he wanted to es-
tablish the nature of "right" and "wrong" as defined in the
M'Naghten doctrine.215
Cardozo, however, had another agenda. The second agenda
dealt with Hans Schmidt's other plea: that he ought to be granted a
new trial because his insanity plea at the first trial was a sham.
216
Schmidt termed his change of heart "newly discovered evidence" for
the sake of his appeal.217
Cardozo was not in an enviable position. The facts on which he
hoped to base his analysis of insanity were, in fact, made up.
218
There was no reason for Cardozo to examine the jury instructions,
since they were used to interpret testimony that Schmidt admitted
was false. The judgment would have to be based on the "newly dis-
covered evidence" argument.
However, Cardozo was not about to let an opportunity pass to
explore such an important question of law as the right/wrong stan-
dard of M'Naghten. What he did was an earlier, less oracular version
of what he did in Palgraf First, he edited the facts of the case to
emphasize the bad faith aspects of Schmidt's insanity defense. Sec-
ond, he quickly disposed of Schmidt's claim for a new trial on the
basis of "newly discovered evidence." Then, in a remarkable rhe-
torical trope, he made it seem as if he had to reach Schmidt's next
argument, though he had just disposed of the case in the previous
paragraph. Following this, he supported his view of "right" and
"wrong" in legal insanity jurisprudence with an extensive historical
analysis, concluding that the weight of history favored an expansive
reading of "wrong" to include moral, as well as legal, wrong. Fi-
nally, he barely mentioned the "facts" of Schmidt's initial confession
in his discussion of insanity.
All these strategies conspire to produce an opinion very typical
of Cardozo. His style and rhetoric convince subliminally, so that it is
214. See id. at 80-81.
215. See Schmidt, 110 N.E. at 949.





difficult to imagine the case coming out any other way. The effect of
this rhetoric of inevitability is also typical of Cardozo. In the writ-
ings of a lesser jurist, it is easy to separate facts, holding, ratio deci-
dendi and dicta. Cardozo, by contrast, often seems to be all holding.
Even his fact patterns are quotable, and even his hypotheticals appear
to have the weight of legal rules.
3. The statement of facts
The true story of Hans Schmidt is a mystery, and the world will
never be certain whether he actually murdered Anna Aumuller in a
delusive rage, or simply chopped up her body to conceal her death
from a failed abortion. A balanced version of Schmidt's story would
tell the tale of a weak, foolish, neurotic priest, who made a horren-
dous mistake under extreme duress and tried to conceal it.
219
This is not the story Cardozo wanted to tell, however. In his
two-paragraph statement of facts, Cardozo wanted to tell the story of
a man who lied. Here is the first paragraph of the opinion:
In September, 1913, the dismembered body of Anna Au-
muller was found in the Hudson [R]iver. Suspicion pointed
to the defendant. He was arrested, and confessed that he
had killed the woman by cutting her throat with a knife. He
repeated this confession again and again. He attempted,
however, to escape the penalty for murder by the plea that
he was insane. He told the physicians who examined him
that he had heard the voice of God calling upon him to kill
the woman as a sacrifice and atonement. He confessed to a
life of unspeakable excesses and hideous crimes, broken, he
said, by spells of religious ecstacy and exaltation. In one of
these moments, believing himself, he tells us, in the visible
presence of God, he committed this fearful crime. Two
physicians of experience, accepting as true his statement
that he was overpowered by this delusion, expressed the
opinion that he was insane. Other physicians of experience
held the view that his delusion was feigned, and his
219. See POLENBERG, supra note 213, at 64-71.
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insanity a sham. The jury accepted this latter view, and by
their verdict found him guilty of murder in the first de-
gree.
220
The first paragraph recounts what Schmidt said before the
trial-but with his word choices, Cardozo foreshadows what the de-
fendant would reveal after the trial. The repetition of qualifiers-
"[h]e told," "[hie confessed," "he tells us," and "he said"-clues the
reader that there is more than meets the eye. Then there is the muted
note of disapproval: Schmidt "repeated [h]is confession again and
again--something which will seem particularly egregious in the
second paragraph when the reader will discover that this makes
Schmidt not only a liar, but a persistent liar. Even Schmidt's insanity
plea comes off badly: Schmidt "attempted, however, to escape the
penalty for murder by the plea that he was insane." Hans Schmidt,
by the end of this paragraph, sounds not insane, but merely disrepu-
table.
In the second paragraph, the foreshadowings of the first para-
graph bear fruit. Hans Schmidt is not really insane. He really is a
liar. And his lies conceal a sordid truth.
Schmidt claims that Anna Aumuller died, not because God told
him to kill her, but from a failed abortion. Additional facts bear out
Schmidt's second story. Anna Aumuller was a cleaning woman at
St. Boniface's Church. Hans Schmidt was a priest at the same
church. In April, 1913, she discovered she was pregnant by Schmidt.
He promised to leave the priesthood and marry Anna, but by late
August he had still not kept his promise. The head priest at St. Boni-
face forced Anna to leave when he discovered that she was pregnant.
On September 1, 1913, Anna tried to perform an abortion on
herself. When Schmidt found her, she was in severe pain and asked
him to find someone to complete the operation. The subsequent
abortion was a horrible failure and Anna died from blood loss.
When Anna's doctor refused to sign a death certificate, Schmidt and
the abortionist, Ernest Muret, devised two strategies. First, they
would cut up Anna's body and sink the pieces in the Hudson River.
Second, if the pieces were found, Schmidt would pretend to be in-
sane in order to protect Muret and his assistant. This made sense to
220. Schmidt, 110 N.E. at 945.
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Schmidt. Abortion was a serious crime in 1912, punishable as first
degree manslaughter with a prison sentence of twenty years. How-,
ever, if Schmidt feigned insanity, said Muret, he would be acquitted
and back at large within a few years. Schmidt agreed to both de-
vices.
Even Cardozo agreed that Schmidt's second story, "with all its
incongruous features,... supplies a plausible explanation of some of
the mysteries of this tragedy.",22 1 This, however, would not help
Hans Schmidt, who had forgotten that one of the first concerns of a
tribunal is to protect its own authority.
In the third paragraph, Cardozo states, "It would be strange if
any system of law were thus to invite contempt of its authority."
222
Not only is Schmidt disreputable, not only is he a persistent liar, but
when is found out, he is brazen enough to demand justice from the
system he has just tried to defraud. By the third paragraph, it seems
not only inevitable but right that Hans Schmidt be denied a new trial.
If it were not for Cardozo's masterful insinuation in his state-
ment of facts, the reader might reverse the proposition: a tribunal
should not condition justice on whether or not a defendant shows re-
spect for its authority. Put this way, whether Hans Schmidt deserves
a new trial is a far closer question than Cardozo's rhetoric would
suggest.
This may, however, have been an impermissible question. Hans
Schmidt's trial was well-publicized, sensational, and sordid. He was
convicted. One does not need to imagine the public outcry which
would have ensued if Schmidt had received a new trial-one only
needs to look at the aftermath of the trials of John Hinckley or Daniel
M'Naghten. The New York legislature might have abolished the in-
sanity plea altogether, and Cardozo would never have been able to
offer his now widely accepted view of M'Naghten's right/wrong
element.
221. Id. at 946. Since Schmidt was pleading insanity, the defense did not
emphasize cause of death at trial. See POLENBERG, supra note 213, at 68.
However, two pathologists later examined Anna Aumuller's body and con-
cluded that she had died of a uterine hemorrhage. See id.
222. Schmidt, 110 N.E. at 946.
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4. The great dictum
Needless to say, Schmidt was unable to present the "newly
discovered evidence" of his fraudulent insanity to another jury.223
Cardozo could have ended the opinion at this point. However, he
chose to continue with Schmidt's next argument: that the trial judge
incorrectly instructed the jury as to the test for Schmidt's insanity.
2 24
In another masterful bit of rhetoric, Cardozo makes this seem inevi-
table by placing the impetus on Schmidt: "The defendant, however,
shifts his ground ...., After this segue, Cardozo goes on to dis-
cuss the question of right and wrong under M'Naghten.
New York was and still is a M'Naghten jurisdiction. After giv-
ing the jury an insanity instruction which closely paralleled the
M'Naghten test, the judge, following the advice of the district attor-
ney, instructed the jury that the word "wrong" in the M'Naghten test
meant, "'wrong according to the law of the State of New York."'
' 226
Schmidt claimed that this instruction entitled him to a new trial.227
The confusion over the meaning of the word "wrong," while not dis-
positive, is the main issue in Schmidt.228
The confusion was not manufactured by the New York trial
court. It was inherent in the original M'Naghten22 9 decision, which
was made by an assembly of common-law judges in the House of
Lords. The assembly had been called because of public outrage over
the acquittal of Daniel M'Naghten by reason of insanity. M'Naghten
had shot and killed Edward Drummond, the private secretary of
Robert Peel, thinking that Drummond was Peel himself. At his ar-
rest, he told the police that "the Tories in my city follow and perse-
cute me wherever I go ... in fact, they wish to murder me."230 The
223. See id. at 945-46. "There is no power in any court to grant a new trial
upon that ground.... The defense now offered by the defendant was not 'dis-
covered since the trial.' It was known to him, on his own showing, from the





228. See id. at 946-50.
229. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
230. MORAN, supra note 25, at 90 (giving a detailed account of the
M'Naghten trial and the facts surrounding it).
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M'Naghten verdict's unpopularity led to the special session of the
House of Lords, in which the English judiciary was asked to clarify
the law of insanity.231 Out of this assembly came what is known as
the M'Naghten test. 2
The trial court judge in Schmidt's case instructed the jury that
"wrong" meant contrary to the law of New York State.233 In other
words, if Schmidt knew that murder was illegal, he could not be
found insane as a matter of law. Schmidt argued that this was error.
Cardozo agreed.234
The M'Naghten assembly was at pains to make a crucial dis-
tinction: that defendant's knowledge of right and wrong was specific
to the act with which defendant was charged. This was in sharp
contrast to the "wild beast test ' 235 of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, which required the defendant to experience a total depar-
ture from reason in order to be exonerated-not simply a cognitive
breakdown with regard to the prohibited act but a generalized loss of
reasoning power. The M'Naghten court was well aware of this defi-
ciency in the wild beast test and took pains to distinguish it from
their "new" M'Naghten test:
The mode of putting the latter part of the question to the
jury on these occasions has generally been, whether the ac-
cused at the time of doing the act knew the difference be-
tween right and wrong .... If the accused was conscious
that the act was one which he ought not to do, and if that
act was at the same time contrary to the law of the land, he
is punishable.236
The M'Naghten judges were concerned that a generalized defi-
nition of "loss of reason" coupled with a definition of "wrong" which
231. See id. at 125.
232. M'Naghten, 8 Eng. Rep. at 722. For the text of the test, see supra note
4.
233. Schmidt, 110 N.E. at 946.
234. See id.
235. "The defendant was not excused unless he was totally deprived of his
reason, understanding and memory, and did not know what he was doing any
more than a wild beast." Rex v. Arnold, 16 Howell's State Trials 695, 764
(1724). The wild beast test was still in use when Rex v. Hadfield was decided
in 1800. See Rex v. Hadfield, 27 Howell's State Trials 1286 (1800).
236. M'Naghten, 8 Eng. Rep. at 722-23 (emphasis added).
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was confined to legal wrong, could be turned on its head. A person
could be acquitted on the grounds of insanity because he did not
know the entire law of England.237 Therefore, they pointedly con-
fined the test to defendant's knowledge of right and wrong as to the
act charged.238 However, the assembly's language causes still more
confusion: a defendant who knows that his act is immoral is punish-
able; so is a defendant who knows his act is both immoral and ille-
gal.239 But the assembly never addresses the defendant who knows
his act is illegal but delusionally believes that it is moral.
Cardozo patches over this hole in the doctrine by assuming that
the M'Naghten assembly was already working from a default as-
sumption of moral wrong, laid down in Bellingham's Case: "It must
be proved beyond all doubt that at the time [defendant] committed
the atrocious act, he did not consider that murder was a crime against
the laws of God and nature." 240 Immorality is primary; illegality is
secondary. The first includes the second. Under this reasoning, the
M'Naghten assembly's real innovation was to even include legal
wrong in the definition of "wrong." By doing so, they expanded the
definition of right and wrong, to explicitly include social wrong, at
the same time as they shrank it temporally, to include only the act
which defendant had committed.
In reality, courts rarely saw moral and legal wrong as conflict-
ing, a fact which Cardozo acknowledges. 241 In Schmidt, however,
the judge's narrow instructions, coupled with Hans Schmidt's
feigned insanity, put the two definitions at odds.
237. See id. at 723 ("If the question were to be put as to the knowledge of the
accused solely and exclusively with reference to the law of the land, it might
tend to confound the jury, by inducing them to believe that an actual knowl-
edge of the law of the land was essential in order to lead to a conviction .....
238. See id.
239. See id.
240. Schmidt, 110 N.E. at 947 (quoting Bellingham's Case, 1 COLLINSON ON
LUNACY 636 (1812)).
241. See id. at 948 ("But the truth, we think, is that the conflict [between
moral and legal right] is more apparent than real .... The real point of the in-
quiry was whether a defendant, who knew that the act was wrong, was excused
because he had an insane belief that either personal or public good would be
promoted by the deed. There was no thought of any conflict between the
commands of law and morals.").
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Cardozo thought that the word "wrong" should mean "moral
wrong," or at least not something as narrow as "legal wrong." 242 It is
here that Cardozo's deific decree "exception" comes into play. Car-
dozo wants to show how deficient the trial judge's instructions
were. 243 To do so, he applied the definition to a hypothetical:
A mother kills her infant child to whom she has been de-
votedly attached. She knows the nature and quality of the
act; she knows that the law condemns it; but she is inspired
by an insane delusion that God has appeared to her and or-
dained the sacrifice. It seems a mockery to say that, within
the meaning of the statute, she knows that the act is
wrong. 24
Consider the sentence leading up to it: "The interpretation
placed upon the statute by the trial judge may be tested by its conse-
quences. ,24 5 This sentence, and the one that.follows the hypotheti-
cal--"If the definition... is right, it would be the duty of a jury to
hold her responsible for a crime" 24 6-suggest that Cardozo, far from
carving out an exception, was simply exploring the limits of the le-
gal/moral and right/wrong dichotomies inherent in a cognitive rule.
Nowhere in these passages does he refer to Schmidt, or the facts of
his case.
Cardozo's hypothetical has clear antecedents. For instance, he
cites Commonwealth v. Rogers,247 where Judge Lemuel Shaw speaks
of the
common instance... where [the defendant] fully believes
that the act he is doing is done by the immediate command
of God, and he acts under the delusive but sincere belief
that what he is doing is by the command of a superior
power, which supersedes all human laws, and the laws of
nature.248
242. See id. at 946-47, 949.




247. 48 Mass. 500 (1844).
248. Id. at 503.
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Shaw, however, cites no authority for this "common instance."
Guiteau's Case,2 49 which elsewhere quotes Rogers approvingly,
2 50
adds an illustration of "[a]nother man, whom you know to be an af-
fectionate father, [who] insists that the Almighty has appeared to him
and commanded him to sacrifice his child. 2 5 1 Again, however, the
judge cites no authority for his illustration. Cardozo could hardly
have been unaware that he was citing hypotheses to support his own
hypothesis.
However, if we accept the idea that Cardozo was creating an ex-
ception, there is no language in the opinion that he intended that it be
limited to auditory hallucinations about God. Rather, it is apparent
that he meant it to stand for all cases in which the mentally disturbed
defendant was unable to distinguish legal from moral wrong. In a
later address to the Medical Society of the State of New York, Car-
dozo offered evidence of what he thought Schmidt stood for:
We held that the word "wrong" in the statutory definition
had reference in such circumstances to the moral quality of
the act, and not merely to the legal prohibition. Any other
reading would charge a mother with the crime of murder if
she were to slay a dearly loved child in the belief that a di-
vine command had summoned to the gruesome act.252
The above passage may suggest that Cardozo was creating a wide
exception or no exception, but the use of a "divine command" illus-
tration does not require that any subsequent use be restricted to the
facts of the illustration.
253
Where Cardozo did want to exclude certain kinds of conduct
from the definition of insanity, he was exceedingly clear. He was at
great pains to point out various common forms of antisocial behavior
249. 10 F. 161 (D.D.C. 1882). Guiteau was charged with the assassination
of President James A. Garfield. See id. at 161. During his trial, he claimed
that his act was inspired by God and pled insanity. See id. at 179-81. The jury
rejected the defense and found him guilty. See id. at 187.
250. See id. at 170.
251. Id. at 172.
252. Benjamin Cardozo, Law and Literature, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF
BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO 386 (Margaret E. Hall ed. 1947).
253. See infra notes 336-41 and accompanying text (arguing that another ra-
tionale for Cardozo using a "divine command" would be that such symptoms
of insanity were far more common in 1915).
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which did not involve a genuinely delusional mistake about right and
wrong: "The anarchist is not at liberty to break the law because he
reasons that all government is wrong. The devotee of a religious cult
that enjoins polygamy or human sacrifice as a duty is not thereby re-
lieved from responsibility before the law., 254  Cardozo, like the
judges in Rex v. Hadfield,255 M'Naghten's Case,256 and Guiteau's
Case,257 was working in a politically charged atmosphere, in which
the insanity defense was seen as a cover for alleged political conspir-
acy.258 In all three cases, there was ample outside pressure to distin-
guish the instant case-a politically tinged assassination or attempt-
from other cases in which the alleged madman could not have had a
political motivation.259 Always present was the popular fear that
left-wing political groups would commit terrible crimes, plead in-
sanity, and never be punished.260 Nonetheless, this still does not
logically narrow the exception to nothing but "deific commands."
Nor was Cardozo creating a volitional exception. In fact, he
distinguishes his cognitive analysis from an earlier volition analysis
in a Massachusetts case, Commonwealth v. Cooper,26 1 where the
254. Schmidt, 110 N.E. at 950.
255. 27 Howell's State Trials 1281 (1800). Hadfield attempted to shoot
George III at the theater and was tried for treason. See id. at 1286.
256. 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). M'Naghten was in contact with chartist and
socialist groups in Glasgow, and his criminal acts were widely thought to be
politically motivated. See MORAN, supra note 25, at 41-59.
257. 10 F. 161 (D.D.C. 1882). Guiteau shot and killed President James
Garfield on July 2, 1881. His defense that "the Almighty had commanded him
to do the act" was also rejected by the jury. Id. at 186.
258. Beginning with the Haymarket bombing on May 3, 1886, anarchists be-
came progressively more feared in the American popular imagination. See
GEORGE WOODCOCK, ANARCHISM: A HISTORY OF LIBERTARIAN IDEAS AND
MOVEMENTS 463 (1962). In 1901, Leon Czolgosz, a self-proclaimed anar-
chist, assassinated President William McKinley. See id. at 464. In 1903, for-
eign anarchists were banned from the United States. See id. at 464-65. In
1921, Sacco and Vanzetti were convicted of armed robbery. See id. at 467.
The crazed, bomb-wielding anarchist was a staple of popular imagination.
Cardozo's remarks about anarchists, and his pains to distinguish them from
genuinely delusive persons, must be seen in this political context. See Schmidt,
110 N.E. at 950.
259. See Hadfield & McNaughtan, supra note 56, at 31.
260. See Letter from Queen Victoria to Prime Minister Robert Peel, in THE
LETTERS OF QUEEN VICTORIA 581 (A.C. Benson ed., 1907).
261. 106 N.E. 545 (Mass. 1914).
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court said "that an offender is not responsible if he was 'so mentally
diseased that he felt impelled to act by a power which overcame his
reason and judgment, and which to him was irresistible.' That is not
the test with us.'262 Cardozo knew he was required by New York
law to stay within the limits of the cognitive test. As he repeatedly
maintained, all he wanted to establish was the fairly mild proposition
that, "there are times and circumstances in which the word 'wrong,'
as used in the statutory test of responsibility, ought not to be limited
to legal wrong."
263
After this exhaustive analysis, Cardozo then returned to Hans
Schmidt, as if to tie all this free-floating analysis to a living, breath-
ing defendant. "We have considered the charge of the trial judge
upon the subject of insanity, because the question is in the case, and
the true rule on a subject so important ought not to be left in
doubt."264 Then, however, he bookends the opinion with another
aphorism: "The law does not force its ministers of justice to abet a
criminal project to set the law at naught.
265
One feels, reading Schmidt, that the facts of this case do not
matter at all. This is certainly true of the insanity analysis, which is
never applied to Schmidt's facts. Cardozo is not making a decision
about the fate of Hans Schmidt. He is making a decision about the
future of the law of insanity.
Once the real Hans Schmidt drops out of the picture, we are left
with Cardozo's masterpiece of pragmatist indirection. The accumu-
lation of historical detail disguises the fact that Cardozo is, in fact,
creating law. The absence of Schmidt himself from the right/wrong
analysis enhances the opinion's resemblance to a treatise. Similarly,
the devoted mother hypothetical is somewhat disguised. It seems to
have precedents, though these precedents are also hypotheticals.
Further, Cardozo takes this "emotionally charged hypothetical"
266
and applies the trial court's jury instructions to it. Since
262. Schmidt, 110 N.E. at 949 (emphasis added) (quoting Cooper, 106 N.E.
at 547).
263. Id.
264. Id. at 950.
265. Id.
266. POLENBERG, supra note 213, at 75.
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Cardozo treats his own illustration with so much care and regard, the
stage is set for the illustration to be elevated to the level of doctrine.
C. State v. Crenshaw267 and State v. Cameron268
The Schmidt case did not immediately go on to create a deific
decree exception. A review of citations to Schmidt before 1983 re-
veals no references to deific decree, deific command or a discussion
of it as a discrete exception.269 Schmidt's more general proposition,
that "legal wrong" alone is an insufficient definition of "wrong" un-
der the M'Naghten test, is widely accepted, though still debated.27 °
Deific decree, however, did not make another appearance until
1983, when the cases State v. Crenshaw and State v. Cameron were
decided. Combined, they are the foundation for the modem doctrine
of deific decree. Their facts also embody the major contradictions
inherent in the doctrine.
In Crenshaw, the defendant, Rodney Crenshaw, had been in and
out of mental hospitals for most of his life.271 He was on his honey-
moon in Canada with his wife, Karen, when he got in a brawl and
was deported. 7z He waited for his wife in a motel room across the
border, in Blaine, Washington. 27 3 When she arrived, however, Cren-
shaw immediately "sensed" that something was wrong.274 Accord-
ing to Crenshaw, "'it wasn't the same Karen ... she'd been with
someone else."' 275 Crenshaw's solution to his wife's perceived infi-
delity was deliberate and thorough: he took her to the motel room
and beat her unconscious; went out, stole a knife from a store, came
back and stabbed her twenty-four times, killing her; went out again,
267. 659 P.2d 488 (Wash. 1983).
268. 674 P.2d 650 (Wash. 1983).
269. See 216 SHEPHARD'S CITATOR SERVICE (NEW YORK REPORTS) 346
(listing over 80 citations to Schmidt). The vast majority cite the proposition
that "[a] criminal may not experiment with one defense, and then when it fails
him, invoke the aid of the law which he has flouted to experiment with an-
other." Schmidt, 110 N.E. at 946.
270. See, e.g., Ranade, supra note 13.
271. See Crenshaw, 659 P.2d at 490.
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borrowed an axe, came back and cut off her head with it.276 He then
sponged down the entire motel room; drove twenty-five miles to a
wooded area to conceal the body and enlisted the help of two hitch-
hikers to conceal his wife's car.277
Crenshaw confessed to the killing.278 At trial, he pleaded not
guilty by reason of insanity.279 The jury rejected the defense and
found him guilty.2 80 Crenshaw appealed.
281
The main issue on appeal was the same one as in Schmidt. In-
sanity defense instruction number ten, which closely followed the
Washington Pattern Jury Instructions,282 also included a phrase at
the end which was not in any code: "What is meant by the terms
'right and wrong' refers to knowledge of a person at the time of
committing an act that he was acting contrary to the law."
283
Such an instruction was particularly troubling to Crenshaw,
given the nature of his defense. In arguing that he should be found
insane, Crenshaw presented the following elements: first, that he had
been diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenic and had been in mental
hospitals for much of his life; second, that his "knowledge" of his
wife's infidelity was an insane delusion; and third, that he was a fol-
lower of the "Moscovite" religion, and Moscovites have a duty to kill




278. See id. at 491.
279. See id.
280. See id. at 490.
281. See id.
282. See WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL 20.01 (2d
ed. 1994) (following WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.12.010 (West 1988),
which is in turn the M'Naghten test, codified).
283. Crenshaw, 659 P.2d at 491 (emphasis added) (quoting Clerk's Papers at
27, State v. Crenshaw, (No. 47498-2) (Wash. Super. Ct. 1980)).
284. See id. at 495. The Muscovite Christians were a conservative sect of
the Russian Orthodox Church, active in the fifteenth century. See Margaret E.
Clark, Comment, The Immutable Command Meets the Unlnowable Mind:
Deific Decree Claims and the Insanity Defense After People v. Serravo, 70
DENY. U. L. REv. 161, 171 n.73 (1992) (citing ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE, A STUDY
OF HISTORY 244, 372 (1947)). However, the court refers to "Moscovite" in
quotations. Crenshaw, 659 P.2d at 494. It is possible that Crenshaw thought
up his own form of "Moscovism."
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There is no evidence that Crenshaw invoked the deific decree
doctrine at trial. He did not argue that the Moscovite God told him
to kill his wife. He instead argued that the delusion regarding his
wife's infidelity, coupled with the belief that Moscovites must kill
unfaithful wives, made him unable to distinguish moral right from
wrong.
285
Nonetheless, the Crenshaw court went to great lengths to point
out that deific decree does not excuse a murderer like Crenshaw.
286
The fact that the court chose to refute a defense that the defendant
did not even raise is circumstantial evidence that Crenshaw's case
was uncomfortably close to Cardozo's classic devoted mother hypo-
thetical. 87 Compare Crenshaw: he is newly married, on his honey-
moon, with his presumably beloved wife. He delusively suspects her
of adultery and is further under an insane delusion that his faith has
commanded him to kill his wife. He knows the nature and quality of
his act, and that it is prohibited by law. However, his "Moscovite"
beliefs dictated that he kill his "unfaithful" wife. He has made a
choice between "the laws of God and man., 288 If the real Muscovite
Church actually demanded that suspected unfaithful wives be sum-
marily executed by their husbands, then Crenshaw might be like the
polygamist which Cardozo excluded from his exception, and his in-
sanity defense would be precluded. 289 That would comport with
common sense: persons who follow "religious" dictates that are
against the law are presumed to have made a premeditated choice
and therefore must live with that choice, even if it means going to
jail.
Crenshaw, on the other hand, operated from his own delusive
"Moscovite" belief, not the dictates of organized religion. The idea
that one ought to brutally murder an unfaithful wife does not come
from scripture, but from Crenshaw's disordered mind.290  It is
285. See Crenshaw, 659 P.2d at 499-500 (Dore, J., dissenting).
286. See id. at 494-95.
287. See Schmidt, 110 N.E. at 949.
288. Id. at 948 (paraphrasing Bellingham's Case, 1 COLLINSON ON LUNACY
636 (1812)).
289. See id. at 950.
290. It is also possible that Crenshaw concocted his "Moscovite" defense
after the fact, hoping that it would explain behavior that he himself did not un-
derstand. If so, then the deific decree defense could simply be excised, and
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important to recognize that he has satisfied one of the elements of
Cardozo's deific decree. He has made a moral choice within the pa-
rameters of a mental disorder. In that sense, Crenshaw genuinely
does not know right from wrong. It is also important to recognize
that Cardozo's hypothetical mother displays no other indicia of in-
sanity-it is enough that she committed that act, with that motiva-
tion, to relieve her of responsibility. The difference between her and
Crenshaw is that she heard the voice of God and Crenshaw did not.
Had Crenshaw said that the "Moscovite" God had ordered him to kill
his wife, he might have had a complete deific decree defense.
291
However, Crenshaw did not have such a defense, and he did not
win. This also seems intuitively correct, considering his brutal
crime, with its evidence of deliberateness, post-homicide conceal-
ment, and Crenshaw's apparently rational behavior with everyone
except his unfortunate wife.292 But all this rational behavior has
nothing to do with deific decree, and the court struggles to reconcile
the doctrine with its own statutes and case law.
The court attempts to address Crenshaw's case in light of the
original M'Naghten rules.293 First, the court reasons that Crenshaw's
fact situation is analogous to that addressed in the justices' answer to
Question One: "a partial insane delusion that he was redressing or
revenging some supposed grievance or injury."294 The right/wrong
distinction in Question One is whether the defendant knew "he was
acting contrary to law; ... the law of the land. 295 In contrast, the
answers to Questions Two and Three require that the defendant be
"conscious that the act was one which he ought not to do... and at
Crenshaw would be evaluated on the other evidence of his insanity, which is
substantial. See Crenshaw, 659 P.2d at 499 (Dore, J., dissenting) (discussing
how two court psychiatrists observed numerous symptoms of paranoid schizo-
phrenia in Crenshaw, and pointing out that Crenshaw had been in mental hos-
pitals 15 times in the eight years prior to his crime).
291. Schmidt does not explicitly require that the "God" of deific decree be a
widely-recognized God. See Schmidt, 110 N.E. at 947.
292. See Crenshaw, 659 P.2d at 492. ("[Crenshaw's] behavior towards oth-
ers, i.e., the motel manager and the woman who loaned him the ax, at the time
of the killing was normal.").
293. See supra note 4.
294. Crenshaw, 659 P.2d at 492.
295. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718,
722 (1843)).
1802
the same time contrary to the law of the land. ' 96 On their face, these
answers would exempt Crenshaw, who believed he "ought" to mur-
der his wife.
Unfortunately, this distinction is specious under the reasoning of
Schmidt, since one of the advantages of deific decree was that it rec-
onciled the answer to Question One with the answer to Questions
Two and Three. In fact, Crenshaw, though it superficially appeared
to resemble the facts of Schmidt, was quite different. Crenshaw, un-
like Schmidt, never suggested that he was pursuing a false de-
fense.297 The judges in Crenshaw therefore had to distinguish Cren-
shaw's acts, not from the acts of Schmidt, but from the acts of the
devoted mother in Cardozo's hypothetical.
They accomplished this in two ways. First, they pointed out that
Crenshaw's acts were similar, not to the devoted mother, but instead
to the "devotee of polygamy or human sacrifice" who knew right
from wrong, but instead responded to a personal belief at odds with
societal morality.
298
This reasoning seems intuitively right-but not because Cren-
shaw resembles a member of a religious cult. It seems to fit because
of the other indicia of Crenshaw's rationality: the fact that his crime
occurred in stages, with prolonged trips to look for weapons and
clean-up tools, 299 the fact of his chat with the motel manager after the
murder,30 0 and the fact that suspected infidelity is a common "sane"
motive for murder.30 1 In other words, irrespective of whether there
was a deific decree exception, Crenshaw could have been found le-
gally sane.
However, the court went on to further distinguish Schmidt, and
in so doing, it created a doctrine: "A narrow exception to the societal
standard of moral wrong... [occurs when] a party performs a crimi-
nal act, knowing it is morally and legally wrong, but believing, be-
cause of a mental defect, that the act is ordained by God. 30 2 It goes
296. Id. (quoting M'Naghten, 8 Eng. Rep. at 723).
297. See Schmidt, 110 N.E. at 945.
298. See Crenshaw, 659 P.2d at 494. Of course, the "devotee[s] of polyg-
amy or human sacrifice" are also hypothetical.
299. See id. at 490.
300. See id. at 491.
301. See id. at 495.
302. Id. at 494 (emphasis added).
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on to describe Cardozo's hypothetical in its own words: "Although
the woman knows that the law and society condemn the act, it would
be unrealistic to hold her responsible for the crime, since her free
will has been subsumed by her belief in the deific decree."
30 3
With this phrase, the Washington Supreme Court has magically
transformed deific decree into a volitional exception to the cognitive
M'Naghten doctrine.
This test performed its intended work: it excluded Crenshaw.
There is no question, on the facts of the majority's case, that Cren-
shaw had a problem with his volition. He freely chose his "Mosco-
vite" duty over societal morality.30 4 The problem is that Cardozo's
devoted mother did the same thing.305 The Crenshaw court's de-
voted mother, however, did not. Under the court's reasoning, her
choosing mechanism, or "will" was subsumed.30 6 In attempting to
exclude Crenshaw from their exception, the court had subtly altered
Cardozo's reasoning and created a new exception.
The court did not have to wait long to use it. Later that same
year, the judges decided the case of State v. Cameron.
30 7
Gary Cameron, a diagnosed paranoid schizophrenic, was ac-
cused of stabbing his stepmother, Marie Cameron, over seventy
times.30 8 Cameron did not deny it. Instead, in a rambling confes-
sion, he explained his actions:
"[S]he kept moving and moving and moving, and kind of
grabbed me like this, but laughing, as if she was enjoying
[being stabbed] ... I mean, the thing was set up that, that's
what she wanted to happen .... [S]he was very much into
sorcery very, uh, anti-God, not really anti-God but takes the
God's truth and twists it into her sorcery."
303. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Schmidt, 110 N.E. at 945).
304. See id. However, as is pointed out in the dissent, one of the examining
psychiatrists, Dr. Nathan Kronenberg, testified that Crenshaw suffered from
classic symptoms of schizophrenia, including auditory hallucinations. See id.
at 499 (Dore, J., dissenting).
305. See Schmidt, 110 N.E. at 949.
306. See Crenshaw, 659 P.2d at 494.
307. 674 P.2d 650 (Wash. 1983).
308. See id. at 651.
1804
"DEIFIC DECREE "1
... "[L]egally I know, that it is against the law, but as far
as right and wrong in the eye of God, I would say I felt no
particular wrong."
30 9
In Cameron's confession, he never mentioned a "deific com-
mand. 31 ° In fact, his feeling of "no particular wrong" "in the eye of
God" is very much like Crenshaw's rational choice of moralities.
311
However, when he was examined by the court-appointed psychia-
trists, they had no trouble concluding that he "believed he was an
agent of God ... [and that] God commanded him to kill his step-
mother." 312 Again, as in Crenshaw, the trial judge gave the same
Washington Pattern Jury Instructions, defining "knowledge of
wrong" as "knowledge that [defendant] was acting contrary to the
law. 313 Cameron was convicted and appealed.314
In contrast to Crenshaw, the Washington Supreme Court had no
trouble concluding that Cameron fit their new "Crenshaw excep-
tion., 315 They made the following inferences from the evidence:
that Cameron suffered from a mental disease; that he believed his
stepmother was "Satan's angel"; that he could not understand that
what he was doing was wrong; and that his free will "had been sub-
sumed by [his] belief in the deific decree." 316 Note that the question
of choosing God's law over the law of man is entirely absent.
The above conclusions are distilled from psychiatric testimony.
However, there are other indicia of Gary Cameron's dissociative
psyche. For instance, he was also convinced that Yasser Arafat and
the Ayatollah Khomeini were persecuting him.317 Similarly, when
he was picked up by police on the highway, he was wearing a
woman's pair of stretch pants and only one shoe.318 In fact, Cameron
309. Id. at 652.
310. See id.
311. Id.; see also Crenshaw, 659 P.2d at 494 (rationale choice of moralities).
312. Cameron, 674 P.2d at 652.
313. Id. at 653 (quoting WASHINGTON PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS:
CRIMINAL 20.01, supra note 282, which in turn follows WASH. REV. CODE §
9A.12.010 (West 1988)).
314. See id. at 651.
315. Id. at 654.
316. Id.
317. See id. at 653.
318. See id. at 651. Previously, Cameron was picked up and released. At
that time, he also had on a woman's housecoat and a shirt. See id.
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is demonstrating two of the characteristic symptoms of schizophrenia
as described in DSM 1V: disorganized thinking and grossly disor-
ganized behavior.
3 19
Contrast this to Schmidt's behavior after his fictional "mur-
der"320 and Crenshaw's behavior after his real murder. 21  Both
chopped up their victims' bodies and tried to dispose of them-
3 22
characteristic "guilty" and organized behavior. Nor was Crenshaw's
speech disorganized.323
Within the limits of the doctrine, however, Cameron and Cren-
shaw look very much the same. In his dissenting opinion, Justice
Dore pointed out the parallels: both Cameron and Crenshaw were
diagnosed paranoid schizophrenics who had been repeatedly institu-
tionalized,32 4 both believed they had religious duties to kill their vic-
tims, both carried out their beliefs, both challenged the same jury in-
structions. 3 5 The real difference, as Justice Dimmick points out in
his dissent, is that Cameron received a direct command, and Cren-
shaw merely interpreted his religious beliefs (supposedly the teach-
ings of that same God) to compel him to carry out the act. 3 2  In other
words, without changing the Cardozo hypothetical to a volitional ex-
ception, there is no distinction between Cameron and Crenshaw.
Are these cases consistent, and are they consistent with
Schmidt? The answer lies in the idea of "choice" within the confines
of a delusion. If we are convinced that the defendant makes an "in-
sane choice" of God's law over societal law, then all three go free,
319. These are two of the five "characteristic symptoms" which make up
"Criterion A" in the DSMIV manual. See DSM IV, supra note 16, at 285. To
be diagnosed with schizophrenia, the subject must exhibit two "Criterion A"
symptoms in his "active phase," and the condition must persist for at least six
months. See id. at 274-75. If the delusions are "bizarre," like Gary Cam-
eron's, then only one "A" criterion is required. See id. at 285.
320. See Schmidt, 110 N.E. at 945.
321. See Crenshaw, 659 P.2d at 490-91.
322. See id.; Schmidt, 110 N.E. at 945.
323. Crenshaw murdered his wife because he thought she had been unfaith-
ful. "'[I]t wasn't the same Karen... she'd been with someone else."' Cren-
shaw, 659 P.2d at 490. Compare Cameron's speech: "'[S]he was very sym-
bolic with the 'Scarlet Whore Beast' she was very much into sorcery very, uh,
anti-God...."' Cameron, 674 P.2d at 652.
324. See Cameron, 674 P.2d at 656-67 (Dore, J., dissenting).
325. See id. at 657-58 (Dore, J., dissenting).
326. See id. at 658-59 (Dimmick, J., dissenting in part).
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the devoted mother, Cameron, and Crenshaw. If we make deific de-
cree a problem of "subsumed will," then Crenshaw, who chose his
belief, goes to jail. Cameron, who received a command, is presump-
tively insane. As for the devoted mother, we need more facts.
Some of the facts we would want to know are: Did she receive
a direct command from God? Did she believe her child was "Satan's
angel"? And, perhaps more important, what were the other indicia of
her insanity? Was her speech dissociative, her affect flat? Did she
wander naked on the highway after her murder? Did she delusively
believe that Judge Cardozo was persecuting her?
The above points to two conclusions. First, it is arguable that
what distinguishes Cameron from Crenshaw is not command versus
choice, but the fact that Cameron's collateral behavior was so much
more disordered than Crenshaw's. Cameron wandered on the high-
way, leaving his stepmother dead in the bathtub;3 27 Crenshaw went
to a nearby service station for a sponge and a bucket to clean up the
blood and concealed the body 200 miles from the scene of the
crime.328 Do we really need deific decree to distinguish these cases?
Second, the very idea of choice is inimical to a volitional excep-
tion. By definition, the person whose "free will [is] subsumed by...
the deific decree 329 is not capable of making a choice. And yet
choice of morals is what deific decree is all about. If defendant's
will is overcome, the source of the command is irrelevant; it can be
God, or it can be Paul Newman. 330 If defendant makes a choice (of
God's law), he is no longer within the borders of the exception.
Subsequent case law seems to recognize some of these inherent
inconsistencies. In People v. Serravo,331 the Supreme Court of Colo-
rado, sitting en bane, refused to certify deific decree as a per se ex-
ception to the standard of "societal wrong," instead defining it as "an
integral factor in assessing a person's cognitive ability to distinguish
327. See id. at 651.
328. See Crenshaw, 659 P.2d at 490-91.
329. Id. at 494.
330. See IRVING I. GoTTEsMAN, SCHIZOPHRENIA GENESIs 47 (1991). In this
case study, the subject said that he received encouragement in his struggles
against the CIA from the television, in the person of Paul Newman, among
others. See id. at 4748.
331. 823 P.2d 128 (Colo. 1992).
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right from wrong. '' 332 Following Serravo, a Washington Appeals
Court refused to follow the volitional nature of the "Crenshaw deific
decree" exception, reasoning that, since the Washington Supreme
Court has never allowed an irresistible impulse defense, it must not
have meant to define deific decree as a volitional defense.
333
However, just as the sun seems to be setting on deific decree,
new applications come to light which apply the test without altera-
tion. In People v. Galimanis, the Colorado Court of Appeals, citing
Serravo, distinguished the defendant, who sometimes felt "God-like"
from the person who is commanded by God to act.334 In People v.
Wilhoite, an Illinois Appellate Court distinguished "voice of God"
hallucinations from defendant's actions: she took her child to the
window, told him, "We have been saved and we are going to
Heaven," and attempted to throw him out the window.
335
None of these opinions addresses the central contradiction in
deific decree-that, though it must logically be a cognitive exception
to a cognitive doctrine, it really has no practical value except as a
volitional exception. And, by extension, if it is a volitional excep-
tion, it really should be broadened to include all "command halluci-
nations." If it were so inclusive, its status as a per se exception could
be abandoned, and it could be, to paraphrase the Serravo court "an
integral factor" in determining whether defendant is capable of per-
ceiving a coherent reality, in which right and wrong exist as cogni-
tive opposites.
VI. SHOULD WE KEEP IT?
It is possible that, in 1915, when Justice Cardozo wrote his
opinion in Schmidt,336 he thought he was addressing a matter which
might actually arise in the courts. After all, Guiteau's Case337 had
included a defense of "divine command., 338 Further, Cardozo may
332. Id. at 139. The court also noted that the Washington court added the
volitional component to the Schmidt definition. See id. at 139 n.12.
333. See State v. Potter, 842 P.2d 481, 488 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
334. See People v. Galimanis, 944 P.2d 626, 631 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1997).
335. People v. Wilhoite, 592 N.E.2d 48, 55-56 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
336. 110N.E. 945 (N.Y. 1915).
337. 10 F. 161 (D.D.C. 1882).
338. Id. at 186.
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have thought that, by positing an exception, he would be occupying
the field of command hallucination fairly well.
This conclusion is supported by the highly literary facts of
Schmidt, most of which were left out of the opinion.339 Schmidt's
delusions were exceedingly detailed, and full of gaudy imagery.
340
His images of blood-drinking and scandalous sexual practices proba-
bly made superb newspaper copy.
While true delusions are good indicators of cultural trends, fake
delusions may be even better. Where Hans Schmidt got the idea for
his story is purely speculative, but there is no doubt that he thought it
would be believable. This suggests that deific decree delusions were
not unheard of in early twentieth century America. 341 As discussed
above, deific decree may once have had some practical use as a cate-
gory in a largely Christian country.
To survive in a pluralistic society, however, deific decree has to
justify itself on doctrinal terms. It is here that deific decree shows its
deeply ingrained and fatal flaws.
339. Schmidt claimed to have a lifelong sexual fascination with blood, which
carried over into his relationship with Anna. His obsession with blood and its
connections with the Catholic religion culminated in-he claimed-the man-
ner of Anna's death.
According to Schmidt, he wanted to know what God thought of
Schmidt's intimate relations with Anna. To this end, he brought her to the
church and had sexual intercourse with her on the altar. The entire time, he
kept his eye on the host to see if there was any change. There was no
change-but later, while saying mass, Schmidt heard the voice of God: "Anna
should be a sacrifice of love and atonement." On the night of the murder he
heard the voice again, speaking insistently.
According to Schmidt, he consummated the sacrifice by cutting Anna
Aumiller's throat, decapitating her, drinking her blood, and having sex with
her corpse. He then chopped her body into seven pieces, because "seven was
the number of candles on the altar, and seven was the number of the secrets of
Christ." Later, of course, Schmidt claimed to have made all of this up. See
Polenberg, supra note 213, at 59-60.
340. See id.
341. Deific decree has been part of the American literary landscape for a
long time. One of the first novels written in the new republic was WIELAND;
OR, THE TRANSFORMATION; AN AMERICAN TALE by Charles Brockden
Brown. One of its major plots concerns a man (Wieland) who believes that
God has commanded him to murder his wife and children. See CHARLES
BRoCKDEN BROWN, WIELAND; OR, THE TRANSFORMATION; AN AMERICAN
TALE (Doubleday/Anchor 1973) (1798).
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First, deific decree is internally contradictory. The first contra-
diction, briefly, is: if it is a compulsion, does it matter if God is
speaking? If it is not a compulsion, is the defendant really insane?
This question goes to another contradiction: deific decree makes
sense only as a volitional category, with the defendant unable to re-
sist a "command hallucination." Viewing it as anything else requires
that the defendant make a moral choice. Yet this is what Rodney
Crenshaw did,342 and he was denied the exception. The only work-
able way to treat deific decree as anything but a volitional exception
is to consider it as one factor among many, as did the Serravo
court.3 4 3 At such a point, the pseudo-doctrine has outlived its useful-
ness.
Second, deific decree is culturally archaic, a holdover from the
time when secular and ecclesiastical courts were merged. As a doc-
trine of mercy, in line with the church's often humane treatment of
the mentally ill, deific decree may once have been a positive force.
As a doctrine which treats the religious mentally ill differently from
the secular mentally ill, it is unfortunate. As a legal reflection of a
cultural moment, it is part of the past.
Third, as a technique to make the M'Naghten doctrine more
flexible, it is ineffectual. To begin with, deific decree is as rigid as
M'Naghten itself, and just as hard to prove. Second, it simply does
not do enough. It excepts rigidity with more rigidity. Courts
tempted to use it would do better to adopt the Model Penal Code test.
Cardozo once wrote that "[flew rules in our time are so well es-
tablished that they may not be called upon any day to justify their
existence as means adapted to an end. If they do not function they
are diseased. If they are diseased, they must not propagate their
kind."34 One can think of no better person to pronounce the verdict
of deific decree than the man who inadvertantly created it. If deific
decree does survive-if only in legal casebooks-let it survive as a
lesson concerning the hazy border between rule and rhetoric.
Christopher Hawthorne*
342. See supra note 325 and accompanying text.
343. See People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 139 (Colo. 1992).
344. Cardozo, supra note 35, at 98-99.
* This Comment owes a great deal to Professor Sam Pillsbury of Loyola
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Law School, who contributed to it first as a teacher and then as a very humane
overseer. Thanks are also due to the staff and editors of the Loyola of Los An-
geles Law Review, particularly Stephen Connolly, Melissa Dulac, Erica Reilly,
and David Liu. And the greatest thanks to my family-Wendy, Julien, and
Caroline-who heroically kept their sanity, no matter how much insanity I
brought home with me.
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